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The U.S. construction industry continues to rank as one of the most dangerous 
work environments when compared to other industrial sectors. Construction companies 
are required to record and report lagging safety leading indicators including fatalities, 
injuries, and illnesses. Safety leading indicators provide an opportunity to identify 
construction site hazards and hazardous worker behavior before a fatality, injury, or 
illness occurs. Further improvements are also necessary for construction safety through 
the use of technology. The application of advanced or emerging technologies can have a 
significant role in enhancing construction worker safety performance.  
 This research seeks to report and analyze safety leading indicators, specifically 
near misses. Furthermore, technologies capable of providing alerts in real-time to 
construction equipment operators and ground workers during hazardous proximity 
situations are reviewed. A testing method for proximity detection and alert devices for the 
construction environment is presented. Operator visibility, including impacts of design 
components, is also measured and analyzed.  
One major contribution of this research is the creation of a near miss reporting 
program ready for implementation for construction companies. Other research 
contributions include understanding of impacts of design on operator visibility, scientific 
evaluation data of proximity sensing technology, and a test method for proximity 
detection and alert system deployed in the construction environment. Research 







 The intent of this chapter is to introduce an overview on the status of worker 
safety performance in the U.S. construction industry. Research needs are derived from 
the background review and identified in this section. The motivation of the research is 
discussed as well as an introduction to the identified research needs statement. The scope 
of the research and statement of contributions are also presented. This chapter concludes 
with an outline of the thesis.    
 
1.1 Overview 
  The construction industry employed approximately 5.8 million workers in 2013 
which accounted for 4% of the total U.S. employed workforce [1]. In the same year, the 
construction industry recorded approximately 747,562 establishments [2]. The number of 
fatalities experienced by the construction industry has been on the decline, but has 
stagnated in recent years [3]. Since 2003, the construction industry averages 
approximately 1,010 fatalities per year. Although the number of fatalities experienced has 
declined, the percentage of fatalities when compared to the total U.S. workplace fatalities 
remains close to 19% each year [4]. This percentage of workplace fatalities is much 
higher than the 4% employment the construction industry has of the U.S. workforce. The 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention reported that construction fatalities 
resulted in approximately $10 billion worth of loss due to direct and indirect costs 
between 1992 and 2002 [5]. This study also reported the average cost of each 
construction fatality during that time period was $864,000 [5]. Likewise, the National 
Safety Council (NSC) estimated a cost over $10 billion for fatal and non-fatal 
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construction industry is 2008 [6]. In 2007 alone, the cost of fatal and non-fatal injuries 
cost the industry approximately $6 billion and $186 billion respectively [7].  
 
1.2 Motivation  
 This research aims to enhance the measurement and understanding of safety 
performance by workers on construction sites. Because construction is one of the leading 
industries for workplace fatalities, methods to improve safety performance measurement 
or understanding are needed. A majority of construction safety performance measurement 
strategies currently assess lagging indicators which are measurement criteria based on 
reactive measures (primarily after an accident occurs). These lagging indicator safety 
measures are reported by construction companies to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) on a periodic basis [8]. Lagging indicators are often measured in 
units of lost workday, number of injuries, or fatality rate. The major limitation to this 
form of safety measurement performance is that accidents must occur before hazards or 
unsafe worker behavior can be identified and addressed. 
 Another form of safety measurements called leading indicators pro-actively 
measure safety performance by measuring processes, activities, and conditions that define 
performance can predict future results [9]. One such safety leading indicator is a near 
miss which is defined by the U.S. Department of Labor as an incident where no property 
damage and no personal injury were sustained, but where, given a slight shift in time or 
position, damage and injury easily could have occurred [8]. An advantage of measuring 
leading indicators is that data can be generated and analyzed without the requirement of 
an illness, injury, or fatality to occur.   
 By collecting safety leading indicator data, many possibilities become available 
for enhanced construction site safety [10][11]. Alerts can be provided to workers when 
safety leading indicators are identified (such as when ground workers are in too close 
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proximity to construction equipment) to potentially avoid accidents. By implementing 
technology as a means to identify, record, and alert construction site personnel, it can 
serve as an additional layer of safety protection for construction site personnel.   
  Hazardous proximity situations between ground worker and construction 
equipment accounted for 17% of construction fatalities in 2012 [12]. Current safety 
practices for hazardous proximity situations have proven inadequate for preventing 
worker fatalities and injuries. Safety leading indicators, specifically near misses, can 
provide a supplemental method of measuring worker safety performance with regards to 
this issue. Furthermore, sensing technology can be implemented to reliably provide alerts 
to ground workers and equipment operators during these hazardous situations.   
 
The primary subject matter of this thesis is the following:  
 Creating and implementing a near miss reporting program for construction 
companies for recording, measuring, and analyzing near miss data from construction 
sites and implementing technology as an additional layer of safety protection for safety 
leading indicators - specifically hazardous proximity situations through operator 
visibility measurement and sensing technology to reliably detect, alert, and record 
hazardous events so that safety measurement practices can be enhanced and further 
understanding of construction safety best practices is possible.   
 
1.3 Contributions and Impact 
 The primary focus of this research is capturing and utilizing active safety leading 
indicator data for enhanced construction safety. Construction safety standards currently 
measure safety performance on lagging indicators which require loss to the construction 
industry including worker injuries, illnesses, and fatalities as well as loss in productivity 
and financial losses through medical costs, worker’s compensation, and litigation. Safety 
 4 
leading indicators can potentially transform the way construction site personnel, 
specifically safety managers, measure and analyze worker safety performance. The major 
contributions of this research are the following: 
 
 A near miss reporting program including best practices for reporting, analyzing, 
and disseminating near miss information. This program includes guides for 
implementation into a construction company and potential barriers associated 
with reporting near misses.  
 A testing method is created to evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of 
proximity sensing technology for detection and alerts during hazardous proximity 
situations between ground workers and construction equipment.  
 Scientific experimental evaluation data of proximity sensing technology when 
deployed in a simulated construction environment including coverage area 
measurement, performance during several human-equipment interaction scenarios 
measurement, and personnel interview data 
 Operator visibility measurement and analysis including visibility maps for various 
pieces of construction equipment 
 
 Methods of measuring and benchmarking construction safety performance are one 
impact of this research. By reporting and analyzing near misses on construction sites, 
safety information of potentially hazardous areas can be disseminated through worker 
safety education and training to increase safety awareness. This research also allows for 
real-time decision through alerts during hazardous proximity situations between ground 
workers and construction equipment. Research deliverables including operator visibility 
maps and sensing technology coverage areas can be used for enhanced worker education 
and safety training.   
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
 This thesis aims to investigate safety leading indicators for construction safety by 
creating a near miss reporting program and implementing technology for an additional 
layer of protection for workers during hazardous proximity situations. Table 1 provides a 
brief description of the contents of each chapter.  
Table 1: Title and description of each thesis chapter 
Chapter  Description 
1) Introduction This chapter introduces aspects of the construction industry and 
focuses on safety. A motivation for research is presented as well as 
research contributions and impacts. 
2) Background This chapter provides a review of construction industry accident 
statistics including accident statistics resulting from hazardous 
proximity situations and limited construction site visibility. Active 
safety leading indicators are presented and discussed as well as the 




The hypothesis and objectives are presented in this chapter as well as 
the scope for the research. A framework of the research methodology 
is also presented.  




This chapter presents a near miss reporting program for 
implementation into a construction company. The program provides a 
method for reporting and analyzing near misses as well as 




Laser scanning technology is used to capture areas that are invisible 
to construction equipment operators in this chapter. Four models of 
skid steer loaders are measured to understand how components of 
equipment design impact operator visibility. 
6) Selection of 
Technology 
This chapter presents evaluation data of several technologies thought 
to be capable of providing alerts in real-time to construction 
personnel during hazardous proximity situations. 
7) PPU Position 
and Orientation 
Proximity detection and alert systems using Ultra-High Radio 
Frequency (RF) technology were evaluated specifically for position 
and orientation of system components when deployed in test beds 
designed to emulate typical construction site environments.   




A test method is created to evaluate existing proximity detection and 
alert systems for functionally when implemented on a construction 
site. Several experimental trials are designed and performed on a 
proximity detection and alert system.  
9) Conclusions This chapter summarizes the research findings and concludes the 
thesis. Future research extensions and opportunities of this research 





 The construction industry continues to experience a high number of workplace 
fatalities and injuries when compared to other U.S. industry sectors. Much research has 
been performed in construction safety in an attempt to enhance worker safety 
performance. The following background review discusses construction industry accident 
statistics, safety leading indicators including near misses, human-equipment interaction 
on construction sites, and construction site visibility. A research needs statement and 
statements regarding the research focus are derived from findings of this background 
review and presented at the end of this section. 
 
2.1 Construction Industry Accident Statistics 
 Since the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
construction companies are required to report all fatalities, injuries, and illnesses that 
occur during or as a result of the work environment [13]. Reported accidents are 
categorized into the following: 1) Occupational fatality or 2) nonfatal injury or 3) illness. 
Both of these categories result from a worker becoming fatality wounded, injured, or ill 
from an event or exposure in the work environment. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) analyzes accident data submitted by construction companies [8]. 
 The U.S. construction industry experiences one of the highest worker fatality rates 
per year when compared to other industries. A study completed in 2012 reported the 
construction industry accounted for 18% (775 fatalities) of the nation’s workplace 
fatalities [14]. In an attempt to normalize safety performance between construction 
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companies, OSHA employs the Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) which uses a base 
of 200,000 cumulative worker hours for the ratio [15]. Figure 1 shows the average 
construction industry TRIR compared to construction company participants of the 
Construction Industry Institute (CII). Although Figure 1 shows improvements in safety 
performance from 1989 to 2011, safety improvements within the construction industry 
have been minimal since 2008 [16].     
 
 
Figure 1: OSHA TRIR per year for construction companies [16] 
 
In 2011, the BLS recorded that for every 10,000 workers, there were 117 
recordable cases where the injury or illness was nonfatal and required days away from 
work. These numbers were almost identical to the previous year.  A direct function of 
severity of injury or illness is the number of days away from work due to the injury or 
illness.  For 2011, the median number of days missed due to injury or illness was eight, 
the same value as 2010 [17].   
 Worker injuries on construction sites also present safety concerns for the 
construction industry. These types of accidents negatively impact the success of a 
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construction project through lost work time, increased medical costs, and decreased 
productivity. In 2012, the construction workers experience 179,100 non-fatal injuries 
[18]. This number was slightly lower than the 184,700 injuries reported for the 
construction industry in 2011. All reported injuries and illnesses values are limited to 
accidents involving personnel to be absent from work as a result of the injury [4]. Table 2 
shows a summation table of non-fatal injuries recorded by the construction industry per 
year [4]. Values in parentheses represent the percentage of cases when compared to the 
total non-fatal injuries experienced by the U.S. private industry sector. 
 
Table 2: Non-fatal injuries of the construction industry [18] 
Year Total 
2012 179,100 (6.0%) 
2011 184,700 (8.6%) 
1992- 2010 3,153,701 (10.6%) 
 
2.2 Safety Leading Indicators 
Construction companies are currently required to document work-related 
accidents resulting in injury and illness of employees [4] which are classified as lagging 
indicators because the measurement occurs after an accident occurs. Historically, safety 
performance is determined by lagging indicators such as number of illnesses, injuries, or 
fatalities that result from an unsafe act or hazard [13]. Safety lagging indicators are 
unable to reflect if a hazard has been mitigated, the potential severity of an event, or the 
event causation [19][20]. Unlike lagging indicators, safety leading indicators (including 
near misses) are measurements of processes, activities, and conditions that define 
performance and can predict future results [9][21][22][23]. Examples of safety leading 
indicators include behavior based safety [24][25][26][27], jobsite hazard analysis 
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[28][29], and safety training [30][31][32][33]. One such safety leading indicator is a near 
miss which is defined by the U.S. Department of Labor as an incident where no property 
damage and no personal injury were sustained, but where, given a slight shift in time or 
position, damage and injury easily could have occurred [8]. Other industries, such as 
manufacturing, have adopted these terms for other purposes including describing 
upstream and downstream processes [34]. Currently, neither the U.S. Department of 
Labor nor OSHA collect and analyze safety leading indicators including near miss data 
[35].  
The Safety Pyramid created by Heinrich shown in Figure 2 illustrates that a 
multitude of minor incidents are required for one major incident to occur, and even more 
near misses should occur for some minor incidents [36]. The major incidents (including 
worker fatalities), minor incidents (including injuries and illnesses), and near misses 
(including hazardous behavior and conditions) are work-related. For example, an illness 
could result from exposure to a hazardous chemical on the construction site. An example 
of a near miss related to work-related illness would be a worker being exposed to a 




Figure 2: Heinrich’s Safety Pyramid [36] 
The Safety Pyramid provides a motivation to reduce the number of actual 
accidents by identifying accidents that had potential to occur. Derived theories from the 
Safety Pyramid including the Domino Theory and the Loss Causation Models are 
categorized as linear causation models by many safety theorists [37] which suggest that 
accidents are results of a sequence of events. Several modifications and augmentations 
have been applied to the original safety pyramid including “incidents without damage or 
loss” and “unsafe hazards and conditions” [38]. This supports previous research efforts 
claiming that all serious injury to workers can be successfully prevented through zero 
injury techniques [39][40][41][42].  
Leading indicators are measurements of processes, activities, and conditions that 
define performance and can predict future results [43]. These measurements can provide 
locate and provide guidance on where corrective interventions are necessary. A leading 
indicator is the result of periodic measurements of a specific safety performance. Leading 
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indicators provide opportunities for safety managers to identify areas of safety 
performance that need improvement before injuries are sustained [44]. 
Near misses are categorized as a type of safety leading indicator. Because near 
misses require a meaningful or actionable metric, they are further categorized as an active 
safety leading indicator and must be quantifiable. Near miss incidents are typically not 
reported in terms of hours or worker exposure, but rather as single events or instances 
[45][46]. By recording near misses, construction workers can be educated on strategies to 
prevent future accidents [47]. Near misses meet or exceed requirements of defining an 
actionable leading metric [43]:  
 
 Data must be numeric 
 Data must be easily understood 
 Data must be perceived as credible 
 Data must signal the need for action 
 Data must be related to other indicators 
 Data must not generate unintended consequences   
 
Any safety leading indicator should create a consistent measurement procedure 
such that data recorded is meaningful. A developed measurement process includes: 1) 
personnel knowledgeable about the process to be measured, 2) personnel trained to 
collect information and data in a consistent fashion, 3) a defined methodology for 
information and data collection, 4) a defined frequency and schedule for information and 
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data collection, 5) tools formatted for the consistent collection of information and data, 
and 6) a repository for the information and data.  
 
2.3 Human-Equipment Interaction 
Of the construction fatalities experienced in 2012, 17% (135 fatalities) resulted 
from workers being struck-by an object or piece of construction equipment. In 2011, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 122 fatalities resulting from collisions between 
construction personnel and equipment or objects. These fatalities account for 17% of all 
fatalities experienced by the construction industry in 2011 and 2.5% of the total fatalities 
experienced by the U.S. private industry sector [48]. Since 2003, the construction 
industry has averaged 192 fatalities resulting from construction equipment or other 
objects striking workers per year [4]. These fatalities resulting from workers being struck 
represented 3% of the totally workplace fatalities experienced in 2012 by the U.S. private 
industry sector [48]. Figure 3 shows the total construction fatalities and those caused by 
ground worker contact with objects or equipment between 2003 and 2012 [48]. 
 
Figure 3: Construction fatalities caused by contact with objects or equipment [48] 
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A longitudinal study identified minimal significant change over time between 
fatalities caused from contact collisions between construction equipment and ground 
workers between 1985 and 2009. Although the number of fatalities resulting from contact 
collisions decreased during this time frame, the percentage when compared to total 
construction fatalities remained consistent [49]. Approximately 33% of workers fatalities 
caused by contact collisions on construction sites were struck by construction equipment. 
Even in highway work zones, more worker fatalities are caused by struck-by events from 
pieces of construction equipment rather than commuting vehicles [50]. Members of the 
CII also reported a significant portion of their worker fatalities were caused by struck-by 
incidents as shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4: Cause of fatalities per year of CII members [51] 
In 2012, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found the private sector of the construction 
industry reported 18,072 injuries caused by ground workers colliding with construction 
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equipment or other objects [4][52]. These injuries represent 10% of all the construction 
worker injuries in that year. The injuries caused by struck-by incidents in 2011 comprised 
15% of the total injuries experienced by the construction industry that year (26,690 
injuries).  
Various research efforts have attempted to better understand risks to workers on 
construction sites [53][54], specifically hazardous proximity situations between 
construction workers and equipment. Harsh outdoor environmental characteristic of 
construction sites integrated with the repetitive nature of construction tasks have been 
found to cause workers to lose focus and awareness of their surroundings [55][56]. One 
study claimed the actual cause of proximity issues are neither being properly examined 
nor recorded. If the information is recorded, important details of the incident are not 
included [57]. This study further identified two general problems resulting in proximity 
issues between construction equipment and workers in the industry: 
 
1) Workers and equipment operators: Outdated or never implemented policies, a 
lack of knowledge of existing specific risk factors, and repetitive work tasks 
2) Incident investigation: All incident causation data is collected after-the-fact 
resulting in no or limited real-time incident information. 
 
Other research efforts focused on strategies for prevention of hazardous proximity 
situations on construction sites. Preventative measures include implementing a 
construction equipment maintenance checklist and internal traffic control (ITC) plans 
specific to each project [55] or path planning for equipment [58]. The ITC plan is created 
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during the planning phase in an attempt to limit turning or reverse movements of 
construction equipment. Management tools have also been created to pro-actively prevent 
struck-by falling objects on construction sites [59] as well as attribute-based risk analysis 
methods to identify potential struck-by hazards in design models [60].  
 
2.4 Equipment Operator Visibility 
Visibility related issues have an impact on the overall safety of the construction 
industry. One of the leading causes of contact collisions between construction equipment 
and workers are blind spots [57][61]. Blind spots are a product of poor visibility in which 
an equipment operator’s line-of-sight is impeded by components of the construction 
equipment. 
The close proximity of workers on the ground to heavy construction equipment 
creates many visibility-related issues for operators. Blind spots restrict an operator’s line-
of-sight to objects outside of the construction equipment cabin. Many accident 
investigations and research studies found visibility-related issues created by blind spots 
caused operators to: 1) run over workers and materials, 2) contact other equipment, and 
3) rollover construction equipment [62]. 
 
2.4.1 OSHA Fatality Database Review 
OSHA maintains a database of construction worker fatalities showing the major 
causes of each fatality [35]. Data from 1990 to 2007 was extracted from this database and 
grouped into categories for further analysis [62]. The investigation was completed to 
determine the impact visibility-related issues have on construction fatalities.  
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The database provided 13,511 case descriptions for all the fatalities recorded over 
the time period. The descriptions were examined, and specific visibility information was 
recorded for evaluation. The study found that of the fatal cases studied, 659 fatalities 
were caused by some type of equipment- related visibility issue. The researchers focused 
on 594 of the 659 visibility related fatalities that involved some type of construction 
equipment. 
The 594 visibility related fatalities were divided further into these five categories: 
1) Workers being struck by moving equipment parts, 2) material being lowered by the 
equipment, 3) electrocutions caused by construction equipment striking electric power 
lines, 4) equipment rollovers, and 5) fatalities from workers drowning after construction 
equipment rolled into a body of water. The study found that 87.7% of the construction 
equipment fatalities caused by visibility issues were the result of workers being struck by 
moving construction equipment. 5.1% of the visibility related fatalities were attributed to 
construction equipment roll-over, 3.4% were caused by a worker being struck by part of a 
piece of construction equipment or material, 2.5% resulted from electrocution and 1.3% 
were the outcome of workers drowning after an equipment roll-over [62].  
The findings of this study indicated that blind spots created many visibility-
related problems for construction equipment personnel and ground workers. Of all the 
fatalities reviewed, 4% cited some type of visibility-related issue as a major factor in the 
incident, and 82 fatalities cited visibility-related issues as the direct cause of the fatality. 
Blind spots were specifically cited in 56.1% as the main cause of the incident. Other 
visibility-related issues discussed were obstructions and adverse lighting conditions 
including situations in which the light was too bright (glare) or too dark. Further analysis 
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of the data showed that depending on equipment type, up to 87% of visibility-related 
construction equipment fatalities were not predictable by either operator or worker. In 
summation, the chances to survive contact with construction equipment are minimal. 
 
2.5 Focus 
Fatalities and injuries continue to plague the construction industry. Construction 
companies suffer financial loss, productivity loss, and immeasurable loss such as 
emotional or crew moral when accidents occur [64][65][66][67]. A portion of accidents 
occur because of the limited working space available on construction jobsites. Ground 
workers are often required to work in close proximity to heavy construction equipment in 
the harsh construction environment [68]. The potential for near misses and contact 
collisions between construction resources is high and can compromise the safety and 
health of construction workers. 
Approximately two-thirds of construction companies currently have active safety 
programs [69]. Typically, safety programs are implemented within a specific construction 
company [70][71][72][73] to enhance safety performance of workers. This is achieved 
through strategic modification of an existing safety policy [74], hazard identification and 
analysis [75][76][77], prevention through design [78][79][80], risk mitigation 
[81][82][83], scheduling and planning [84][85], safety training, and many other methods 
to ultimately positively impact the company’s safety culture [86][87][88][89][90]. 
Research and existing practices for hazardous proximity situations in the construction 
industry are currently lacking in the following areas: 
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 Scientific evaluation data for safety technologies in construction 
 Minimal information exists on how to successfully implement and utilize 
proximity detection and alert technologies in construction 
 Equipment operator visibility data near miss incident data and risk management 
analysis have not be integrated to evaluate hazardous proximity situations 
 A method for recording and analyzing safety leading indicator data (specifically 
near misses)  
 
This research focuses on the reporting, recording, analyzing, and providing real-
time alerts for safety leading indicator data, specifically near misses. This research aims 
to understand strategies to measure and analyze safety leading indicator data for 
enhancing worker safety performance by limiting frequency and duration of hazardous 
situations. Existing performance metrics for construction safety have proven inadequate 
for preventing worker fatalities and injuries. This research aims to provide a method for 









 Presenting a methodology for capturing, analyzing, and disseminating near miss 
data 
 Offering guidelines and components for a company specific near miss reporting 
program as well as evaluation tools 
 Activating reliable real-time alerts to ground workers and equipment operators in 
hazardous situations 
 Enable individual worker safety performance monitoring without accidents 
 Measuring operator visibility within an equipment cabin 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The research methodology and framework for safety leading indicators of 
proximity hazards between heavy construction equipment and workers is presented in 
this chapter. Statements of the research hypothesis, objectives, and scope are discussed 
as well as an overview of the research framework. The remaining sections within the 
chapter review the various phases of this research including near miss reporting in 
construction, operator visibility measurement and analysis, evaluation of technology for 
proximity sensing, position and orientation of proximity detection and alert system 
components, and a test method for proximity detection and alert systems.     
 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall goal of this research is to build and evaluate a framework measuring 
the safety performance of workers during construction operations through active safety 
leading indicators. The overall research methodology is categorized into three sections as 







Table 3: Categorization of research methodology sections 
 




Construction site personnel 
identify and report near miss 
events 
Gather and analyze active safety leading 
indicators to generate knowledge for 





Measure and analyze visible 
and non-visible areas for 
equipment operators 
Capture and assess operator visibility to 
enhance operator awareness of potentially 
hazardous areas around construction 





Activate alerts in real-time 
to affected construction site 
personnel during hazardous 
proximity situations 
Detect, alert, and record potential 
proximity hazards between ground workers 
and construction equipment in real-time 
 
 
The near miss data collection section intends to create a framework for a safety 
program within a construction company for reporting near misses, analyzing potential 
hazards, and disseminating gathered construction site safety information. The operator 
visibility awareness section aims to measure and analyze areas that are not visible for an 
equipment operator of a specific piece of construction equipment. Equipment operators 
can become educated of invisible areas around a specific piece of construction equipment 
for increased awareness of potential hazards. Technology is evaluated in simulated 
construction site operations for reliability and effectiveness of detecting, alerting, and 
recording hazardous proximity situations between construction operators and equipment. 
The performance of technology provides guidance for selection and evaluation of other 
systems through system component evaluation. These categories allow for enhanced 
awareness of hazardous proximity situations in construction as well as data collection and 




Active safety leading indicators can provide a supplemental method of measuring 
safety performance of construction workers without experiencing workplace accidents. 
Knowledge generated from the collection of active safety leading indicators (such as near 
misses) can be used to identify potentially hazardous situations on construction sites. 
Sensing technology can be implemented as an additional barrier for worker safety by 
activating alerts during hazardous proximity situations. Proximity detection and alert 
systems can reliably and effectively identify, alert, and record hazardous proximity 
situations while deployed in the construction environment. Four research questions 
emerged during the initial design and development of the research framework that are 
essential to evaluate the stated hypothesis. The following are the research questions:   
 
1) Can near misses be recorded and analyzed to increase awareness of potential 
hazards on construction sites? 
2) Can operator visibility be measured and analyzed for education of equipment 
operators of invisible areas around construction equipment? 
3) Are proximity detection and alert systems capable of detecting, recording, and 
alerting construction personnel and equipment operators in real-time of hazardous 
situations? 
4) How should proximity detection and alert systems be evaluated for potential 
deployment onto construction sites? 
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3.3 Objectives and Scope 
By identifying, recording, analyzing, and disseminating active safety leading 
indicators, an additional measurement of worker safety performance is possible. 
Additionally, technology can be implemented to accomplish this through real-time data 
collection and alerts during hazardous proximity situations. The primary goal of this 
research is to enhance construction site safety conditions for workers during heavy 
construction equipment operation. To achieve this, several necessary objectives are listed: 
 
 Create a near miss reporting program for implementation into a construction 
company 
 Test, measure, and evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of proximity 
detection technology in the construction environment 
 Create a test method for evaluating the reliability of proximity detection and alert 
systems  
 Measure and analyze the visibility of operators of specific pieces of construction 
equipment 
 
The scope of this research is limited to hazardous proximity situations between 
construction “ground” workers (workers that primarily complete construction tasks while 
walking on the ground plane surface) and heavy construction equipment operating on the 
ground surface. The research will include private construction companies or government 
entities performing construction in the U.S. Information gathered from data sets of 
private construction companies will not contain any proprietary information. Selected 
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construction activities between heavy construction equipment and ground workers 
(human-equipment interaction) are the large majority focus of this research, although 
near miss reporting applies to all identified hazards on a construction site. Specific 
proximity hazards considered in the research included worker contact with heavy 
equipment on the ground surface.  
 
3.4 Framework 
The research methodology follows a framework that stems from hazardous 
proximity issues between construction resources and site conditions. The framework 
utilizes the previously mentioned three categories of research (near miss data collection, 
operator visibility measurement, and proximity hazard sensing) to generate and 
disseminate knowledge from raw data collection. Proximity issues are presented as a 
result of the close interaction of construction resources (labor, equipment, and materials). 
An overview of the research framework is provided in Figure 5. Columns of the 
framework detail the evaluation, analysis, deliverables, and resulting safety education and 
training of each research category.  
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Figure 5: Research framework 
  
The initial data collection phase of this research includes laser scanning construction 
equipment cabins, evaluating technologies thought to be capable of detecting and alerting 
construction personnel during hazardous proximity situations, and interviewing 
construction personnel about near miss reporting programs. Each component of the 
collected data was evaluated and analyzes to further guide research efforts including field 
trials of proximity detection and alert systems, point cloud data analysis for operator 
visibility, and longitudinal interviews with construction personnel with regards to near 
miss reporting programs.  
 Multiple research deliverables resulted from the evaluation and analysis of 
collected data. Operator visibility maps for select pieces of construction equipment, 
coverage area maps for proximity detection and alert systems, components of a testing 
method for proximity detection and alert systems, and a near miss reporting program 
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were created based on results of the data analysis and evaluation. Suggestions for 
implementation of research deliverables is also discussed in each subsequent section.  
 
3.5 Near Miss Reporting Program 
 Chapter 4 presents a near miss reporting program that can be implemented in a 
construction company, government entities that require construction, or construction 
industry organizations. The program was created based on interview data of construction 
personnel that participate in near miss reporting programs. The research also investigated 
near miss reporting programs in other industry sectors including aviation, healthcare, and 
manufacturing. Components of a near miss reporting program, such as a near miss 
reporting template, program evaluation tool, and reporting best practices, are discussed. 
The created near miss reporting program was implemented on existing construction 
projects and periodically monitored for four months during normal construction 
operations. Findings of the periodic review were used to further modify the created near 
miss reporting program. This work is located in Chapter 4.  
 
3.6 Operator Visibility Measurement 
 After reviewing and creating a near miss reporting program for all near misses, 
the next logical step is to focus specifically on select leading indicators for potential 
mitigation of hazards and increase in worker safety performance. One such safety leading 
indicator is operator visibility. This portion of the research strives to measure operator 
visibility as a safety leading indicator and identify potential areas for near misses around 
pieces of construction equipment.  
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 One identified cause of contact collisions between ground workers and 
construction equipment is limited equipment operator visibility. By measuring operator 
visibility, equipment operators can increase their awareness of limited or non-visible 
areas around a specific piece of construction equipment. This research is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5. A spatial point cloud was generated by using a three-dimensional 
(3D) laser scanner to scan the interior and exterior of an equipment cabin. The point 
cloud was analyzed for percent visibility and visible areas versus invisible areas to an 
equipment operator. Several pieces of construction equipment were measured for areas 
visible and invisible to an equipment operator. Four models of one piece of equipment 
were measured to demonstrate how construction equipment design impacts operator 
visibility. Design characteristics that improved operator visibility were identified through 
the data analysis efforts. 
 
3.7 Technology Evaluation 
 Another safety leading indicator for construction site safety performance is 
distance between ground workers and construction equipment. Furthermore, technology 
can be used to detect, record, and analyze near misses with regards to ground workers 
being in too close proximity to construction equipment. 
 Existing wireless remote sensing technologies can potentially allow real-time 
decision making for construction site personnel with regards to safety. Because 
construction sites are dynamic environments often requiring construction resources to 
interact in limited space, providing alerts in real-time to construction site personnel 
during hazardous conditions could enhance safety performance. The research presented 
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in Chapter 6 identifies technologies thought to be capable of providing alerts during 
hazardous proximity situations as well as recording events for further analysis. Candidate 
technologies identified through background review efforts were further evaluated through 
laboratory and field tests. Proximity detection and alert systems were deployed in 
simulated construction site environments to evaluate the system’s ability to perform in 
the harsh construction environment. Further testing including position and orientation of 
system components of a selected technology is presented in Chapter 7.  
 
3.8 Testing Method for Proximity Detection and Alert Systems 
 Human-equipment interaction on construction sites contribute negatively to 
construction safety across the industry. Scientific evaluation data is currently lacking for 
proximity detection and alert systems intended for use in the construction industry. Based 
on the background review of technologies thought to be capable of providing real-time 
alerts during hazardous proximity situations, a testing method was created to provide a 
standard for evaluating proximity detection and alert systems. Chapter 8 presents 
components of the testing method that incorporates various combinations of static and 
mobile construction equipment and ground workers to measure the system’s alert 
distance and repeatability. The test method proscribes a coverage area experiment that 
evaluates the alert distance of the system from several worker approach angles.  False 
positive and false negative alerts are also identified and used to analyze a specific 





NEAR MISS REPORTING PROGRAM FOR CONSTRUCTION 
SAFETY 
 
 Leading indicators for safety can provide an additional metric for assessing 
worker safety performance on construction sites. Near misses are one such safety leading 
indicator that can identify hazardous behaviors and conditions on construction sites. A 
near miss reporting program for construction companies is presented in this chapter. The 
program was created from results of construction site personnel interviews and other 
U.S. industry sectors that utilize near miss reporting. Components of the program include 
near miss reporting guidelines, a database template for reporting and analysis, and a 
program evaluation tool for periodic review by safety managers. Near miss reporting 
enables safety managers and other construction site personnel to identify hazards before 
an accident occurs through the investigation and analysis of reported near misses.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 By recording and analyzing near misses on construction sites, an additional metric 
for safety performance becomes available for construction companies [91][92][93]. 
Safety managers and other site personnel can identify hazardous conditions and worker 
behavior before an accident occurs through reporting and investigating near misses. Near 
miss information can equip safety managers to identify and mitigate hazardous issues 
which enable pro-active worker safety training and education.  
 A background review of near miss reporting programs both in the construction 
industry and other U.S. industry sectors was completed. Results of the background 
review were used to create an interview tool deployed on multiple classifications of 
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construction site personnel. Best practices of near miss reporting were identified through 
the background review effort and results of the construction site personnel interviews. 
These best practices were categorized into various sections and served as guidelines for a 
near miss reporting program. This program can be fully implemented into a construction 
company, or individual components can be adopted by companies with an existing near 
miss reporting program. The created near miss reporting program achieves the following: 
 
 Creates an actionable definition of a near miss 
 Demonstrates how reporting can be a positive experience for all construction 
personnel 
 Describes how near miss data can be effectively collected, analyzed, and managed 
 
 A set of interview questions for various construction site personnel were created 
based on the results of the literature review. These questions can be viewed in Appendix 
A of this report. The objective of the initial interviews was to identify benefits and 
limitations to specific near miss reporting programs currently utilized by construction 
companies. Results of the literature review and the initial interview provided the required 
data to create near miss reporting program guidelines. The created guidelines were 
implemented on active construction sites and monitored periodically for four months. The 
periodic reviews of projects with implemented near miss reporting guidelines revealed 
barriers that were addressed in the near miss reporting guidelines. Several research 
deliverables such as program evaluation tools and a database template were created to 





 A review of various aspects of near miss reporting is discussed in this section. 
Specifically, the definition of a near miss, near miss data collection, near miss reporting 
methods, and near miss reporting programs implemented in other U.S. industry sectors 
are all discussed. Many of the findings from the literature review were incorporated into 
the created near miss reporting program for construction companies.  
 
4.2.1 Near Miss Definitions 
 The reviewed literature indicated that definitions of a near miss vary across 
individual companies and across industries. The difference in definitions reveals the 
challenge of accurately defining a near miss across any industry. Many attempts have 
been made to define a near miss including:  
 
 A potential to, but does not result in harm [94] 
 An instantaneous event which resulted in the sudden release of energy and had the 
potential to generate an accident [47] 
 An event that signals system weaknesses that if not remedied, could lead to 
significant consequences in the future [95] 
 An event that leaves no injuries or property damage or evidence that they 
occurred [96] 
 An incident or unsafe condition with potential for injury or property damage [97] 
 
 Bechtel, a large construction corporation, defines a near miss as “an incident in 
which a condition exists or an act was carried out that had the potential for injury, 
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property damage, environmental release, or an adverse health exposure to take place. 
Because of various circumstances, the potential injury or exposure did not occur, but the 
potential was recognized” [98]. At British Petroleum’s Toledo refinery, a near miss is 
defined as “an unplanned event where no loss occurs, but given a different set of 
circumstances, an actual loss through injury, damage to assets, environmental harm, or 
business interruption could have occurred” [99]. A near miss analysis report written by 
the Wharton School Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes define a near 
miss as  an event that signals a system weakness that if not remedied could lead to 
significant consequences in the future. As such, a near-miss is also an opportunity to 
improve system structure and stability, and an opportunity to reduce risk exposure to 
potential catastrophe [94][95]. 
 According to the National Firefighter Near Miss Recording Program, a near miss 
is defined as an unplanned event that did not result in injury, illness or damage, but likely 
would have had there not been a fortunate break in the chain of events. The International 
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) founded the near miss program in 2005, through 
funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance. The program established the following goals [100]: 
 
1) To give firefighters and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT’s) the 
opportunity to learn from each other through real life experiences;   
2) To help formulate strategies to reduce the frequency of firefighter and EMT 
injuries and fatalities; and   
3) To enhance the safety culture of the fire and emergency service 
 
 The system provides a volume of near miss experiences which are shared with 
firefighters and EMT’s around the country. The system received its 5,000
th
 report in 2013 
and continues to record near miss events. The collected data is used to formulate 
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strategies to reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities. Information is disseminated by after 
action podcasts, electronic mail, and seminars [100].  
 
4.2.2 Near Miss Data Recording 
 After interviewing senior managers of various construction projects, one study 
found that near miss reporting had not been given the same consideration and importance 
as accident investigation [101]. Similarly to other company specific programs, near miss 
reporting strategies also vary from company to company. The Bechtel Corporation uses 
the following steps for identifying and recording a near miss [98]: 
 
1) Incidents occurs   
2) Employee reports the event   
3) Superintendent records the event 
4) Management discusses the event at the next management meeting 
5) Safety department publishes briefing report  
6) Safety department makes recommendations on how to avoid such an event 
7) Supervisors and safety team review the effectiveness of the corrective actions 
8) If corrective actions are not effective, the supervisors and safety team reviews 
and establishes new procedures until the corrective actions are effective 
9) If corrective actions are effective, a final report is issued to everyone on the 
project team 
 
 Conoco Phillips, an energy production corporation, uses a reporting system called 
the Industrial Hygiene Metrics and Reporting Procedure (IMPACT) to report and respond 
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to workplace accidents [102]. This incident reporting and action tracking tool is used to 
report and track all safety incidents. Serious incidents must be entered and reported in 
IMPACT as soon as possible after the incident but no later than two business days after 
the event. Exposure incidents, as defined by IMPACT must also be entered and reported 
in IMPACT within two business days after determination that the exposure incident 
occurred. The report is automatically distributed to managers and other safety personnel 
when the appropriate reporting fields have been completed. Specific fields of the 
IMPACT report are required to be completed to record the investigation and corrective 
actions. After a full investigation has taken place and actions to avoid recurrence have 
been identified, the information is entered in IMPACT [102].   
 Other companies implement automated technology to record and analyze near 
miss incidents [96]. Caterpillar, a heavy construction equipment manufacturer, uses an 
Autonomous Real-Time Tracking System of Near Miss Accidents (ARTTS-NMA) on 
construction sites [103]. This system employs ultrasonic for outdoor and indoor real-time 
location tracking, sensors for environment surveillance, Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) for access control as well as storage of safety information about workers, 
equipment and materials, and wireless sensor networks for data transmission. All system 
components are integrated into a RFID sensor network architecture that features a 
relatively low cost and fast implementation with a pure wireless network backbone [104]. 
 
4.2.3 Near Miss Reporting Methods 
 A research report about near miss reporting methods in the University of Texas 
healthcare system describes the development and implementation of the “close-call 
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reporting system”. This system allows the report to be submitted anonymously so that 
reporting personnel are not identified by their superiors. A multidisciplinary health care 
team adapted this approach to develop a close call categorization scheme based on human 
factor principles. This system, which is available in web-based and paper formats, allows 
reporters to submit close calls in a risk-free manner and enable the collection of 
information about the etiology of close calls. This information is used to identify areas of 
vulnerability and to develop interventions that can prevent problems from recurring. The 
development and implementation processes provide a comprehensive framework that can 
be used for future deployments of similar patient safety systems. The framework includes 
the following categories for consideration when developing a near miss reporting system:  
 
1) Definition of a close call 
2) Potential barriers encountered 
3) Feedback mechanisms to reporters 
4) Format and content of the system 
 
 The research team developed close call categories including blood transfusion, 
diagnostic test procedure, equipment and devices, falls, medication, other treatment, 
surgery, therapeutic procedures, and contributing factors [105]. 
 Another method of reporting incidents in the healthcare industry, specifically 
when working with hydrogen, is The Hydrogen Incident Reporting Tool [106]. This tool 
is intended to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned, voluntarily, and other information 
gained in real experiences that occurred while working with hydrogen. The target 
audience for this tool is users of hydrogen technology. A web-based database was created 
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for users to allow access for the intended users at any location with internet access. The 
safety event record in the database is characterized such that it facilitates a means for 
users to search and access information about specific records. The following list shown in 
Table 4 displays the different search criteria [106]: 
 
Table 4: Search criteria for recorded close call events [106] 
Category Description 
Title Uniquely characterizes the nature of the safety event in a shortened 
form 
Severity Identifies the event as an incident, near miss, or non-event utilizing the 
noted definitions (a non-event is defined as a situation, occurrence, or 
other outcome that is relevant to safety) 
Description Describes the incident and contains any applicable information such as 
discussion of causes, other reports, photographs, and sketches 
Lessons 
Learned 
Defines the lessons learned and specific suggestions for avoiding 
similar incidents in the future 
Causes Characterizes the primary cause(s) of the event (e.g. abnormal 
operations, laboratory experiment, routine maintenance, and equipment 
failure) 
Setting Where the event occurred (e.g. laboratory, hydrogen production facility 
or hydrogen delivery vehicle) 
Equipment What types of equipment were involved (e.g. flexible hosing, piping 
and fitting, storage vessel, or cylinder) 
Characteristics Defines the hydrogen involved as high pressure or low temperature 
Discovery Defines when the event was discovered (e.g. during operation, 
maintenance, or inspection) 
Hydrogen 
Release 
Notes whether hydrogen was released during the event 
Ignition Notes the source of ignition, if applicable 
Damages  Characterizes the nature of the damage or injuries 
Factors Characterizes factors contributing to the event, ranging from human 
error to equipment failures 
 
 One of the most effective methods reviewed for data collection of near misses is 
an online database format. Many industries have an online database that is searchable 
using industry specific criteria. These databases are comprised of information that is 
submitted voluntarily by the workers that are involved in the incident or by other 
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witnesses of the event. The information can be submitted to the online database 
anonymously or with the person submitting being identified. Dissemination of the 
analyzed information has been shown to dramatically increase both the number and 
quality of reports [47].     
 
4.2.4 Near Miss Reporting Methods in Other Industries 
 Near miss reporting has been found to be an effective management tool in other 
industries. Statistically significant decreases of lost time injury rates in offshore drilling 
suggesting an increase in near miss reporting may lead to a 60 percent reduction in lost 
time injuries. In onshore oil and gas programs, a near miss reporting rate of 0.5 near miss 
reports, per person, per year was correlated with a 75 percent reduction in lost time 
injuries [95].   
 Annually, around 44,000 patients die as a result of medical errors [107].  Perhaps 
this is the reason that healthcare professionals, particularly doctors, are reluctant to report 
adverse events to their superiors [108]. For a period of 19 months beginning in 2001, 
researchers recorded errors related to transfusion medicine. The researchers recorded 819 
near miss events. They concluded that of the 819 near misses reported, the median 
number of events per month was 51 and that overall, 61 of the events were potentially life 
threatening. The three most concerning events that were recorded were: 1) samples 
collected from the wrong patient, 2) mislabeled samples, and 3) requests for blood for the 
wrong patient [109]. Barriers and reporting incidents of nursing homes were also 
investigated [110].  
 In the chemical process industry, the analysis of near-miss management has been 
studied and detailed [106]. Seven stages are presented that outline the reporting of a near 
miss in the chemical process industry: 1) Identification, 2) disclosure, 3) distribution, 4) 
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direct and root-cause analysis, 5) solution determination, 6) dissemination, and 7) 
resolution. The study describes how employees may be reluctant to report near misses 
due to potential recriminations that could result. These potential recriminations are: 
 
 Peer Pressure: Employees may feel pressure from colleagues not to report 
 Investigation Style: Length investigations that require employee participation may 
discourage future reporting 
 Direct Disciplinary Action: Concern of receiving a verbal warning, addition of 
incident to employee record, up to and including job dismissal discourage 
reporting 
 Unintended Disciplinary Action: Upon incident investigation, additional job tasks 
or wearing cumbersome PPE may be perceived as punishment for reporting [94] 
 Lack of an incentive to report: The significance of reporting events has not been 
communicated to workers [106] 
 
 When a near miss event occurs in a nuclear reactor, or if Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) inspectors discover damaged or deteriorating equipment, the NRC 
reviews the risk to the reactor. According the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
report, over 200 such reviews were conducted by the NRC in 2010 [111]. Most incidents 
discovered at nuclear plants are low risk, but when an event or condition increases the 
risk of reactor core damage by a factor of 10, the NRC likely dispatches a Special 
Inspection Team (SIT). When the risk increases by a factor of 100 or more, an 
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) may be sent to investigate, and an Incident Inspection 
Team (IIT) is sent if the risk increases by a factor of 1,000 or more. While no IIT’s were 
dispatched in 2010, there were 14 instances, known as "near-misses," when the NRC had 
to dispatch inspection teams, including one AIT [111]. In Ireland, the energy industry is 
making an effort to improve their near miss data recording practices. The initiative has 
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been underway since 2011 and the industry is seeing exponential increases in reporting 
[112]. 
 A study was conducted over a period of seven years between 1999 and 2006 at a 
mid-sized electrical manufacturing plant in an effort to prevent workplace injuries.  A 
database of near misses, minor injuries, and OSHA recordable injuries was created. 
During the study’s duration, 1,690 events were reported including 261 near misses, 1,205 
minor injuries and 205 OSHA recordable injuries [113].  
 Companies conducting transportation services have also benefitted from reporting 
and analyzing near misses [114]. Safety in the aviation industry in the United Kingdom is 
continuously monitored by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). This organization has 
implemented a number of mechanisms in place for reporting and assessing potential 
safety incidents. The CAA operates a Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme (MORS) 
in accordance with the European Union (EU) Directive. The program is intended to 
record occurrences which endangered or which, if not corrected, would have endangered 
an aircraft, its occupants, or any other person. The objective of the scheme is to 
contribute to the improvement of air safety by ensuring that relevant information on 
safety is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated. The goal of occurrence 
reporting is to prevent accidents and incidents, and not necessarily to attribute blame or 
liability. The scheme applies to all registered or operated aircraft in the United 
Kingdom’s airspace [115].  
 Aircraft Proximity Hazard (Airprox) is an aviation industry term for what is 
commonly referred to as a near miss. The United Kingdom’s Airprox Board is an 
independent organization sponsored jointly by the CAA and the Ministry of Defense to 
deal with all Airprox events reported within the United Kingdom’s airspace. The primary 
objective of Airprox is to enhance flight safety with regards to lessoned learned and 
applied from near miss occurrences. An Airprox is a situation in which, in the opinion of 
a pilot or a controller, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and 
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speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved was or may have been 
compromised. Safety recommendations were aimed at reducing the risk of recurrence of 
a particular Airprox. These reports can only be made by pilots or air traffic controllers 
and cannot be submitted by passengers or members of the public who are on the ground.  
 While the previously discussed industries have implemented various elements of 
near miss management programs, the construction industry has been slower to adopt near 
miss reporting [47]. Benefits of identifying, reporting, and analyzing near miss events 
include an opportunity to learn in order to prevent these events from occurring in the 
future. However, these recording methods also experience limitations. These limitations 
can be that there is no incentive to report a near miss occurrence, or that workers may be 
fearful that there will be negative repercussions from reporting a near miss. The worker 
may feel they may be retaliated against for reporting the incident.  
 In summary, the BLS keeps record of workplace accidents, but does not track 
near misses. Several industries including construction, firefighting, healthcare, airline, 
and chemical processing have specific and unique definitions of the term near miss, but 
some similarities exist in the overall theme. These industries have developed and are 
currently implementing near miss identification and reporting methods that are intended 
to be used as an education tool for workers. Although near misses can greatly improve 
safety performance measurement and potentially performance, no single measure of 
safety performance is optimal, but rather the entire safety picture generated by using all 
prescribed safety measures [45].  
 
4.3 Objective and Scope 
 The primary objective of this research is to identify best practices associated with 
near miss reporting programs including effective methods for identifying, collecting, and 
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assessing near miss information. The research scope is confined to the construction 
industry; however experiences gained through the use of near miss reporting in other 
work settings in other industries will also be exampled. Only non-injury, non-fatal events, 
and portions of safety programs addressing these near miss events are examined. The 
created near miss reporting program is specifically designed for implementation within 
construction companies.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
 In order to accomplish the stated objective, the research utilized a methodology 
including a detailed literature review, interview of construction site personnel, creation of 
near miss reporting guidelines, and validation through periodic monitoring of near miss 
reporting programs on active construction sites. The flowchart for this methodology can 
be viewed in Figure 6. Specific terminology and details included in the flowchart will be 
referenced throughout this section. 
 
Figure 6: Research methodology flowchart for near miss reporting 
 
4.4.1 Literature Review 
 Safety performance of construction workers is largely measured by lagging 
indicators including injuries, illnesses, and fatalities [13]. Although previous research has 
focused on leading indicators for construction safety, minimum emphasis has been placed 
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on reporting and analyzing near misses. Literature on near miss data collection and 
reporting methods were reviewed including construction and non-construction 
applications. Industries and organizations such as firefighting, airlines, manufacturing, 
chemical processing, energy production, the U.S. military, and the medical field have 
found value in reporting near miss events. Leading safety companies within the 
construction industry are also reporting and analyzing near miss data. These industries 
and individual companies provided near miss reporting program material, definitions of 
near misses, and process of information flow for reporting and analyzing near miss 
information. 
 
4.4.2 Initial Construction Site Personnel Interviews 
Participants of this research were safety directors assigned to active construction 
projects in which a near miss reporting program was implemented. An interview sample 
size determination equation [115][119] was used to determine the number of participants. 
The following parameters were used to determine a sample size of construction 
companies required: estimated variance in population is 0.5, desired precision is 0.05, 
confidence level is 95%, the number of people in the population is 729,345 [1]. With an 
estimated response rate of 100%, a total of 75 participants were needed. The limiting 
variable of the site personnel interviewed was restricted by the availability of 
construction sites presented by members of the research team. A total of 47 construction 
sites were initially interviewed.   
Findings of the literature review were used to identify evaluation criteria required 
for near miss reporting programs. Various interview questions were created from the 
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review for construction safety managers, field supervisors (foremen), and laborers on 
active construction sites. A copy of the interview questions used for all three categories 
of site personnel can be found in Appendix A of this report. The created interview 
questions inquired about information regarding the following: 
 
1) Company Information: Safety record (OSHA TRIR), annual revenue, number of 
employees, and services provided 
2) Project Information: Total cost, percent complete, safety record, cumulative work 
hours, first aid incidents, number of safety personnel and first line supervisors 
3) Near Miss Reporting Program: Initiating party, near miss definition, flow of near miss 
information, investigation strategy, number of reported near misses, overall 
perception of the program, description of all aspects of the program 
 
Participating interview personnel were from construction companies that had 
previously implemented a near miss reporting program. A total of 47 interviews (21 
phone interviews and 26 site visits) of different construction sites were conducted to 
compile data about existing near miss reporting programs. For each interview, one safety 
manager, two crew supervisors (mostly foremen), and two workers (craft workers and 
laborers included) were questioned. The country and region of the interview projects are 
listed in Table 5. The interview project locations and number were limited to the 
available active construction sites with near miss reporting programs who desired to 
participate in the study.  
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Table 5: Location of interview projects 
U.S.  International  
Region Number Country Number 
Northeast 2 Canada 7 
Northwest 6 Singapore 2 
Southwest 12 Norway 1 
Southeast 17   
 
Figure 7 shows the various locations of individual construction projects that were 
interviewed including unique symbols to designate the cost, the number of cumulative 
work hours (duration), and the number of workers. The symbols in Figure 7 are sized 
based on a ratio for the minimum and maximum value for each category. For example, 
the project with the largest amount of workers has the largest hard hat symbol.   
 
 
Figure 7: Initial interview project location, cost, duration, and number of workers 
 
In addition to being located in various parts of the world, construction sites that 
were interviewed also had a wide range of costs, construction type, number of personnel, 
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number of safety personnel, cumulative work hours, and OSHA TRIR’s. Table 6 gives 
the range values for some of the metrics evaluated.  
 
 Table 6: Interview project metrics 
Project Metric Median Range 
Cost $1.5 billion $5 million to $10 billion 
Cumulative Work Hours 1.6 million 10,800 to 12 million 
Number of Workers 408 26 to 2,600 
Number of Safety Personnel 6 1 to 60 
OSHA TRIR 0.82 0 to 4.30 
 
Cronbach’s alpha was used as the reliability measurement method for information 
obtained from the interviews [120]. Participants of the survey were given asked to 
respond to the same question two different times during the interview. Participants were 
asked on two different occasions to give the number of near misses he or she had reported 
during a certain time period. Because a majority of the respondents provided the same 
number for both questions, the Cronbach’s alpha from this initial survey was 0.91. 
Cronbach’s alpha values higher than 0.7 are deemed to be reliable interview results from 
the respondents questioned.   
 
4.4.3 Near Miss Reporting Guidelines 
The quantitative and qualitative data compiled from the initial construction site 
personnel interviews were analyzed to formulate preliminary conclusions regarding ways 
of implementing and monitoring effective near miss programs within construction 
companies. A preliminary set of guidelines for an effective near miss reporting program 
was created based on the review and interview analysis results. The guidelines were 
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divided into seven separate categories: 1) Define, 2) roll out, 3) collect, 4) analyze, 5) 
corrective actions, 6) share, and 7) share.  
 
4.4.4 Long Term Construction Site Personnel Interviews 
 The created near miss reporting guidelines were deployed into nine different 
construction sites of nine different construction companies for further evaluation 
longitudinal study. The research team completed monthly interviews with identified 
safety managers for each construction site for a four month duration. The safety managers 
were asked for the following information: 
  
 Number of near misses reported  
 OSHA total recordable events reported 
 Cumulative work hours 
 Project OSHA TRIR 
 Number of stop work authority events 
 Opinion concerning the effectiveness and value of the program 
 Experienced benefits and limitations 
 Changes made to the near miss reporting program 
 Effectiveness of each change implemented 
 
Of the construction sites selected for interview of safety managers, five were 
selected as “intervention.” This term is used to describe the sites because each general 
contractor on the five construction sites fully implemented the created near miss reporting 
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program guidelines. The other four construction sites selected for interview projects were 
categorized as “monitoring” projects because each general contractor had previously 
implemented a near miss reporting program. For the monitoring projects, the general 
contractor adopted portions of the newly created guidelines, but did not implement every 
component of the created near miss reporting guidelines. Results of the monthly safety 
manager reviews allowed for further modifications of the created near miss reporting 
program. The interviews also provided a test and validation for the implemented near 
miss reporting program.  
 
4.5 Results 
Results of the construction site personnel interviews, literature review, and 
existing near miss reporting programs were used to create best practice guidelines for a 
near miss reporting program, a process framework for information flow of near miss 
reporting, and several research deliverables that supplement the near miss reporting 
guidelines including a database template and program evaluation tool.  
 
4.5.1 Initial Construction Site Personnel Interviews 
 Several statistical analyzes were performed on both the quantitative and 
qualitative data collected during the interviews of safety managers, supervisors (mostly 
foremen), and craft workers. A stepwise regression was completed based on the 
quantitative results of the construction site personnel interviews. The regression 
performed at a 95% confidence interval resulted in a p-value less than 0.0001, an adjusted 
r-squared value of 0.89, and a standard error the estimate was 17.4. The dependent 
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variable for the regression was near misses reported per cumulative work hour to 
normalize the various sizes and scopes of construction sites interviewed. Of the variables 
evaluated, the following collectively statistically explained 26% of the correlation with 
near misses reported per cumulative work hour: 1) Reported first aid incidents, 2) near 
misses investigated, and 3) number of craft workers on the construction site. Table 7 
shows the evaluated coefficients and their corresponding weights based on the results of 
the construction site personnel interviews. The results indicate that of the interview data 
collected, the OSHA TRIR was the most highly correlated with the number of near 
misses reported. (e.g. the lower the OSHA TRIR, the higher the number of reported near 
misses).  
Table 7: Dependent variables of the near miss reporting interview data 
Variable  Weight 
OSHA TRIR 42.21% 
Near misses investigated 11.42% 
Number of safety personnel 9.87% 
Number of first aid incidents 9.65% 
Number of supervisors 8.38% 
Number of craft workers 5.23% 
Safety manger years of experience 4.89% 
Safety manager time on the project 4.25% 
Percent complete 4.01% 
Number of field workers 0.01% 
Cumulative work hours Less than 0.01% 
Project cost Less than 0.01% 
Annual revenue Less than 0.01% 
Number of employees  Less than 0.01% 
 
4.5.2 Near Miss Reporting Program Guidelines 
A set of near miss reporting guidelines were created based on identified best 
practices from the literature review and initial construction personnel interview effort. 
The near miss reporting program guidelines are separated into individual steps of the 
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following near miss reporting cycle. Each of the seven steps contains recommended best 
practices for a near miss reporting program within a construction company. The 
guidelines are categorized into the following: 1) Define, 2) rollout, 3) collect, 4) analyze, 
5) corrective actions, 6) share, 7) encourage. The near miss reporting cycle is displayed in 
Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Near miss reporting program cycle 
 
4.5.2.1 Define 
A set of suggestions were created regarding the definition of a near miss reporting 
program including general program information. The suggestions listed are: 
 
1) Contractor should develop a company specific near miss reporting program that is 
suited for their type of work 
2) The near miss reporting program can be tailored to meet specific needs of each 
individual project 
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3) Owners should require a near miss reporting program as a prequalification 
requirement for contractors 
4) If the owner requires a different near miss reporting program, the contractor may 
be required to implement additional regulations and practices to satisfy the owner     
5) Program should remain flexible to accommodate varying site conditions and 
safety cultures 
6) Safety managers should create a company specific definition of what qualifies as 
a near miss.  
7) General near miss definition: “An unplanned event or unsafe condition that has 
the potential for injury/illness to people, or damage to property, or the 
environment. 
Near miss definition examples: 
- Hazardous conditions where no bodily or property damage occurred, but a 
situation that requires investigation to prevent future occurrences  
- An opportunity to improve safety practice based on a condition, or an incident 
with potential for more serious consequence 
- A specific event, or sequence of events, or extended conditions that could 
have produced unwanted or unintended impacts on the safety or health of 
people, property, or the environment 
8) A near miss definition should accomplish the following: 
- Differentiate near misses from worker injuries, illnesses, or fatalities 
- Describe near misses as an event, set of conditions, unsafe behavior, or 
combinations of these   
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9) Possible alternate terms for near misses: Opportunity for Improvement (OFI), 
near hit, near accident, near loss, and good catch 
 
4.5.2.2 Roll Out 
Based on the literature review and initial construction site personnel interview 
data, recommendations were created for rolling out (or implementing) a near miss 
reporting program within a construction company. The recommendations are the 
following: 
 
1) Introduce new employees to general aspects of near miss reporting through new 
employee orientation 
2) Educate employees on specific aspects of the near miss reporting program 
through site specific safety orientation 
3) Subcontractors should understand and utilize the general contractor’s near miss 
reporting program 
4) Workers should be trained to identify near misses (most important: high 
frequency and high severity incidents) through hazard recognition  
5) Safety managers can train workers on near miss recognition and reporting as the 
project’s schedule progresses (for example, train workers to identify near misses 
associated with concrete before construction on the foundation begins) 
6) Inform workers of barriers to near miss reporting (e.g. fear of retaliation) and 
educate workers on how this program bridges these gaps 
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7) Administrative training is also necessary so that safety managers and company 
managers can access, understand, and analyze the near miss reporting information 




Construction site personnel educated on identifying a near miss should be 
provided an effective system to report near misses. The following recommendations 
provide guidance on how to collect near miss data:  
 
1) Anyone on the project can report a near miss (workers, supervisors, safety 
managers, or any other site personnel) 
2) Anyone can report near misses for personnel from other crews or other companies 
3) Worker and supervisor checklist form is available at several locations throughout 
the site (see Appendix A.4)  
4) Information on checklist includes: Time of event, reporter, reporter’s supervisor, 
incident type, severity, type of event, crew, frequency of previous events, incident 
description, safety category, and photos (by authorized owner or contractor 
representative) 
5) The reporting process should include these steps in order: 1) Identification, 2) 
reporting, 3) distribution, 4) investigation, 5) solution, and 6) dissemination.  
6) The information flow of near misses is shown in Figure 9. A description of each 


















Table 8: Steps and descriptions of the near miss process information flowchart 
Step  Title and Description 
1.  All construction site personnel are trained on all aspects of the near miss 
reporting program 
2.  A worker trained in identifying near misses 
3.  After observing, a worker reports the near miss on the reporting form and/or 
informs his/her immediate supervisor 
4.  The worker and safety personnel decide if no action is taken to fix the situation, 
will a continued immediate danger exist? 
5a.  If an immediate danger exists, the safety personnel and worker will first take 
immediate action to eliminate the danger 
5b.  If an immediate danger does not exist or has been corrected, the safety personnel 
determines the severity (weighted score) of the reported near miss 
6.  The severity of the reported near miss is determined from a previously 
established weighted scale  
7a.  Safety personnel, supervisors, and the reporting worker review the report and 
visit the location of the reported near miss 
7b.  The investigation team identifies hazards associated with the reported near miss 
and develop a corrective action plan 
8.  Create a report detailing the findings of the near miss investigation and 
corrective action plan 
9.  Safety personnel using the investigation findings and corrective action plan will 
correct the current conditions  
10.  Findings of the investigation and corrective actions taken are reported to all site 
personnel at scheduled meetings 
11.  Findings are integrated into existing safety training for workers  
 
7) Standards can be established depending on project variables (number of craft 
workers, project size, number of supervisors, and many others) for the number 
and quality of near miss reports an individual submits (e.g. each worker must 
submit at least 2 near miss reports per week)  
8) Supervisors should submit near miss reports on intrinsically safe mobile computer 
devices (e.g. an iPad or iPhone) using the near miss report form 
9) Near miss worker reports should be entered into the near miss database by the end 
of the workday 
10) Read-only database should be accessible to all employees 
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11) Supervisors should take and upload photos (when authorized) of the near miss 
incident into the database 
 
A sample database template was created for immediate implementation or 
integration into an existing company safety reporting database. The database is capable of 
the following functions: 1) User-interface reporting form, 2) view table of near misses 
reported, and 3) reports based on specific criteria to near misses. The user must input the 
following information: 1) Date of event, 2) time of event, 3) severity (contains a pull-
down menu), 4) project name, 5) company name, 6) crew members involved, 7) 
employees involved, 8) event description, 9) investigative team, 10) immediate cause, 11) 
contributing cause, 12) corrective action, 13) resolution description, 14) identification, 
and 15) category. The identification and category entries were derived from the 
Eindhoven classification system [106][121]. Definitions for each category of error 











Table 9: Eindhoven classification system [106][121] 
Identification Category Definition 
Skill Based 
Slips Failure in highly developed motor skills such as using 
a hammer, using powered and non- powered tools. 
Tripping Failure in whole body movements such as climbing a 
ladder, tripping on even ground, swinging arm out 
and hitting something, or kicking something. 
Rule Based 
Qualifications The wrong combination of a person’s education and 
experience versus the task at hand. Asking someone 
to do something in which they have limited 
experience or no knowledge.  
Coordination A lack of coordination between two construction 
groups such as walking into a barricaded area. 
Groups not coordinating with each other. 
Verification The incomplete assessment of something on the 
worksite such as using equipment which hasn’t been 
inspected. 
Identification Failures that result from faulty task planning such as 
hazards not identified on the Jobsite Hazard Analysis 
(JHA). 
Monitoring Monitoring a situation inappropriately such as not 
realizing a hazardous situation. 




Knowledge Inability of a person to apply their existing 
knowledge to a new situation such as a person not 
knowing a new rule. 
 
 A unique near miss identification number is assigned to each near miss reported. 
Every field should be eventually completed throughout the cycle of one near miss 
reported. Each near miss requires a new form. The table section displays each near miss 
reported and can be arranged by severity, company, or any other input metric. The 
database provides for tracking of an individual near miss by allowing for review input 
and resolution description of the near miss. Figure 10 displays the reporting form for this 
database template. A sample report and user instructions are shown in Appendix A.5 of 
this report.   
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Figure 10: Near miss reporting form for the database template 
 
4.5.2.4 Analyze 
In an effective near miss reporting program, safety managers, and construction 
supervisors will receive many near miss reports from site personnel. The following 
suggestions advise near miss reporting program facilitators on how to effectively analyze 
near miss reporting information. 
 
1) All reported near misses are investigated by an investigation team of a safety 
managers, the observer, the observer’s supervisor, and any other personnel 
involved with the reported near miss 
2) Near misses should be investigated within the week that the event occurs 
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3) After the investigation, the investigative team can assign a severity level to the 
event and update the report in the online database (e.g. category of 1, 2, or 3 
where 3 is the most severe)  
4) The near miss reporting database should be user friendly so that safety managers 
can easily enter and analyze near miss reports 
5) An online company-wide safety database should be established for recording and 
trending all reported near miss events (should be integrated into an existing 
company safety database) 
6) Company management personnel should have access to review near miss reports 
and analysis 
 
4.5.2.5 Corrective Actions 
The following items provide suggestions to construction companies on how to 
derive and implement corrective actions based on submitted near miss reports.  Based on 
the findings of the investigation, the team can determine corrective actions.  
 
1) The investigation team should identify and record root causes, and possible 
solutions to the near miss incident [56][123]   
2) Findings of the investigation should be included in the near miss report in the 






After a near miss has been reported, investigated, and resolved; lessons learned 
information should be integrated into construction worker safety training. The following 
are suggestions on how to effective disseminate gained knowledge: 
 
1) Management personnel from the contractor and owner should hold a monthly 
meeting to discuss general information about the near miss reporting program 
2) Near miss reports from one project should be accessible to all safety managers in 
the company to share with other project personnel 
3) Safety managers should use results of near miss reports to improve safety training 
and education   
4) Safety managers should discuss weekly high frequency or high severity near miss 
reports received in the previous week during project specific safety meetings 
5) Safety managers should review the near miss reporting program during weekly 
safety meetings including: Previous reported near misses, changes to the near 
miss reporting program, weekly number of near misses, charts and graphs from 
analysis, and reminders to workers of the reporting process (self-promoting the 
program) 







As is true for many safety program components, strategies must be established to 
encourage employees to report near misses. The following are recommendations on how 
to encourage employees to report near misses:  
 
1) Workers should receive no punishment for reporting near misses unless it directly 
violates a current safety policy (advertise as fact-finding and not fault-finding) 
2) Near miss reports are posted on the project’s bulletin board and other signs 
throughout the project 
3) Lessons learned from near miss reporting can be printed in the company’s 
newsletter 
4) Workers that speak languages other than English should be provided aid (near 
miss reporting information in other languages or through a bi-lingual translator)   
5) A message should be broadcast over the workers’ radio to remind them to report 
near misses 
6) Incentives: Reward workers for quality and quantity of submitted near miss 
reports  
7) The safety manager should communicate the significance of the near miss 
reporting program 
8) Company management should invest and advertise the near miss reporting 
program 




4.5.3 Near Miss Reporting Evaluation Tool 
 A tool was created to evaluate an existing near miss reporting program within a 
construction company. The evaluation tool allows users additional interaction with the 
near miss reporting guidelines by comparing a specific near miss reporting program 
within a construction company to the presented guidelines. Safety managers and other 
management personnel within a construction company are given several questions 
pertaining to their specific near miss reporting program. The goal is to provoke thought 
about modifications or additions that can be made to existing near miss reporting 
programs while a user is completing the exercise. User responses are also used to provide 
an overall metric and category specific metrics. Suggested practices based on the near 
miss reporting guidelines will be provided for the user. The tool informs users of “needs” 
areas in which suggested modifications to the program are provided. A sample interface 
page of this evaluation tool for the “General Program Information” section can be viewed 




Figure 11: Sample user interface of the near miss reporting evaluation tool 
Users of the near miss reporting program evaluation tool will be asked to rate 
their input towards a total of 63 statements and short answer responses. The content for 
each statement was derived from the near miss reporting program guidelines. Each 
question is weighted evenly, but this can be modified by the user to further customize the 
near miss reporting program. The final interaction allows the user to access 
recommendations from the near miss reporting guidelines based on their individual 
program score. This evaluation tool can be used throughout the lifecycle of a project to 
monitor the progress of the near miss reporting program. For a list of all statements posed 
by the near miss reporting evaluation tool, see section A.6 in the Appendix of this report. 
Figure 12 shows an interface provided to the user after all responses are recorded within 




Figure 12: Scoring interface for the near miss reporting evaluation tool 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The construction industry desires to eventually obtain an accident free jobsite 
including a zero fatality rate for each construction project. Current industry standards 
require the measurement and recording of lagging indicators such as illnesses, injuries, 
and fatalities which only provide safety performance measurement after an incident 
occurs. Identifying, reporting, and analyzing safety leading indicators including near 
misses can enhance employee abilities to identify hazards, improve safety training, and 
validate performance metrics. This research shows that near miss situations can be 
recorded and analyzed through an effective near miss reporting program.  
A review of existing near miss reporting programs within construction companies 
and other industries was completed. Further investigation was conducted on specific 
components of near miss reporting programs including the definition of a near miss, 
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reporting strategy, and flow of information. Several construction personnel interviews on 
active construction sites with a near miss reporting program were conducted. A second 
phase of interviews periodically surveyed active construction projects that implemented 
the suggested near miss reporting guidelines. Interview results were used to create best 
practice guidelines for a near miss reporting program, an information process flowchart 
for near misses, and an evaluation tool for existing near miss reporting programs.  
 Future work includes automatically reporting and analyzing near miss data from 
an active construction site. The program evaluation tool could also record and archive 
entries to provide a longitudinal progression of success and failures of the near miss 
reporting program. A separate interface would trend the performance of the near miss 
reporting program over time. Currently, the tool does not archive or trend past 
performance metrics. New safety concepts and training can evolve from the analysis of 
near miss data collected from a construction project. Workers can be trained on existing 
hazards on the site from reported near misses before an accident occurs.   
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CHAPTER 5 
EQUIPMENT OPERATOR VISIBILITY MEASURMENT AND 
ANALYSIS FOR SAFE EQUIPMENT DESIGN 
  
 Contact collisions between ground workers and construction equipment are often 
attributed to limited equipment operator visibility. This chapter presents a method for 
measuring and analyzing equipment operator visibility by utilizing laser scanning. Several 
models of skid steer loader are evaluated to understand the impact of construction equipment 
design on operator visibility. By capturing areas invisible to an equipment operator, 
hazardous areas for ground workers can be identified and avoided.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Most construction sites are characterized by a multitude of interactions between 
construction equipment, workers, and materials. This dynamic environment creates many 
visibility related issues for construction workers and equipment operators. Non-visible 
areas, called blind spots, are one of the leading causes of contact collisions between 
ground workers and construction equipment in the construction industry [61]. Blind spots 
impede the line-of-sight (LOS) of construction equipment operators creating non-visible 
areas for the operator outside of the equipment cab. Contact collisions can occur when 
workers, equipment, or materials enter these blind spots undetected by the equipment 
operator. The significance of this research is to implement a blind spot measurement 
technique to demonstrate how safety can be promoted through construction equipment 
design. 
 66 
The International Organization for Standards (ISO) code 5006 and 14401-1 
standards describe the experimental specifications for equipment blind spot 
measurements [124][125]. However, the specified method is labor intensive, requires 
special expertise, and is sensitive to environmental parameters such as illuminations and 
spatial constraints [57]. Consequently, the blind spots estimation can be subjective and 
error prone. This method has been used to measure the operator visibility of a variety of 
difference pieces of construction equipment [126][127][128][129]. 
This research utilizes a commercially available laser scanner capable of producing 
a 3D spatial point cloud from both inside and outside the equipment cab. Specifically, 
this research used four different models of commercialized skid steer loaders as an 
example to demonstrate the applicability of blind spots measurement on the variety of 
equipment design. The goal of this study is to demonstrate that equipment design has 
impact on construction equipment operator visibility and blind spots.    
The data recorded from the blind spot measurements was analyzed for percent 
visibility and visible areas versus non-visible areas of an equipment operator as specified 
in the ISO code standards. Measuring blind spot data for different models of skid steer 
loaders can reveal which model and design characteristics provide the optimal visibility 
and least amount of blind spots for an operator. By limiting the research scope to 
different model types of skid steer loaders, the best design characteristics for safety can 






Visibility related issues have an impact on the overall safety of the construction 
industry. One of the leading causes of contact collisions between construction equipment 
and workers are blind spots [57][61]. Blind spots are a product of poor visibility in which 
an equipment operator’s line-of-sight is impeded by components of the construction 
equipment. 
 
5.2.1 Construction Equipment Visibility-Related Issues with Safety 
The close proximity of workers on the ground to construction equipment creates 
many visibility-related issues for operators. Blind spots restrict an operator’s line-of-sight 
to objects outside of the construction equipment cab. Many accident investigations and 
research studies found that visibility-related issues created by blind spots caused 
operators to 1) run over workers and materials, 2) contact other equipment, and 3) 
rollover construction equipment [62]. 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has compiled 
blind area diagrams for 43 pieces of construction equipment. These blind area diagrams 
were developed using manual methods and standards described in the ISO codes 5006 
and 14401-1 standards. This information was produced to develop awareness about 
hazardous areas around construction equipment [144].  
 
5.2.2 Skid Steer Loaders 
As smaller and more mobile equipment emerge in the construction industry, the 
unique configuration of the skid steer loader allows it to complete a variety of 
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construction tasks efficiently. Its compact design and small rigid frame allows the skid 
steer loader to operate quickly and in small spaces. Skid steer loaders have become a very 
effective piece of equipment when assisting groups of workers on the ground. Because of 
its ability to operate in compact spaces, construction workers are often located in close 
proximity to the equipment which can create visual awareness issues for the equipment 
operator [199].  
The Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program was created by 
NIOSH to concentrate on investigations of fatal occupational injuries. Between 1992 and 
1997, the FACE program identified 37 fatalities involving construction workers and skid 
steer loaders [200]. Other research conducted on construction equipment operator 
visibility found that more than half of all visibility-related fatalities occurred when 
construction equipment is moving in the reverse direction [201]. The cases evaluated by 
the study found that approximately 93% of fatalities involving skid steer loaders occurred 
when the equipment was moving in the reverse direction. Previous studies have found the 
commonly known blind spots of construction equipment are to all sides of a piece of 
equipment [130]. The limited operator visibility, specifically to the rear of the skid steer 
loader, made this piece of construction equipment a perfect candidate for this research. 
Constraints of construction equipment available to the researcher also factored into the 
decision to measure visibility of skid steer loaders.     
There have been many developments in operator safety for skid steer loaders. 




 Control interlocks 
 Rollover Protective Structures (ROPS) 
 Falling Object Protective Structures (FOPS) 
 Side screens 
 
Most recent advancements in skid steer loader design have been to remove one 
hydraulic lift arm. This provides an entrance (similar to a car) on the side of the 
equipment. Providing air-conditioned cabins for equipment operators also allowed the 
removal of the metal mesh frames that protected workers from sticking out their arms. 
 
5.3 Objective and Scope 
The objective of this research chapter is to explore the impact of construction 
equipment design on the operator’s visibility. This includes identifying critical parts of a 
skid steer loader cab that creates blind spots. Four commercially available skid steer 
loader models (see Figure 13) were evaluated with regards to the operator’s visibility by 
using one laser scanner to simulate the vision of a human operator positioned in the 
equipment cab. Each evaluation created a rendering of the non-visible areas (blind spots) 
for the different construction equipment and models tested. Possible environmental 
impacts (e.g. sunlight and influence of temperature) were not considered for the blind 
spot measurement methods. 
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Figure 13: Selected skid steer loaders for the study 
 
5.4 Research Methodology 
The workflow for this research was divided into four sequential processes: 1) data 
collection, 2) data processing, 3) blind spot identification, and 4) allocation of design 
inefficiencies. This workflow measured blind spot data for construction equipment, 
transformed the raw data into operator visibility diagrams and quantifiable blind spot 
data, and displayed best design characteristics with regards to safety for skid steer 
loaders. Other pieces of construction equipment were evaluated and are included in the 
Appendix B section.  
 
5.4.1 Spatial Point Clouds 
Data collection for blind spot data used a blind spot measurement tool with a 3D 
laser scanner to evaluate different models of skid steer loaders. The measurement 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 14. A commercially-available 3D laser scanner recorded 
3D spatial data from both a position inside each skid steer loader cabin. The scanner’s 
mirror was positioned at the operator’s eye-height as defined in the ISO-standards 
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[121][122]. Additional laser scans outside each skid steer loader were taken in four 
surrounding locations. Using these locations, the equipment’s structural features creating 




Figure 14: Laser scan measurement of the interior of an equipment cabin 
 
Previous experiments found that the light source emitted by the laser scanners 
generally have no influence on the blind spot measurements [203]. Depending on the type 
of the 3D laser scanner, it registers and stores at a minimum approximately 1.5 million 
data points per scan in a point cloud data file. These data values were registered and then 
converted to a standard X, Y, and Z-coordinate system for blind spot analysis.  
The experimental design of collecting geometry information of the construction 
equipment followed the requirements from existing operator visibility measurement 
standards. Both the ISO code 5006 (Earthmoving machinery-operator field of vision test 
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method and performance criteria) and ISO code 14401-1 (Earthmoving machinery field 
of vision of surveillance and rear view mirrors part 1: test methods) were used as 
standards for blind spot measurement during the experiments [124][125]. The ISO code 
5006 provides a manual equipment blind spot measurement method that was developed 
through years of worldwide experience with construction equipment. This method uses 
two bright light bars spaced at an average human eye width inside the equipment cab. 
The light is projected onto a flat surface around the outside of the equipment cab to 
determine the visible areas to the equipment operator. Dark or shaded areas can be 
interpreted as blind spots for the equipment operator. The ISO code 5006 specifies a 12 
meter radius extended from the operator’s position for the blind spot measurement area 
[124]. The ISO code 5006 requires the skid steer bucket height to be 300 millimeters with 
a tolerance of 50 millimeters in both directions. This is also known as the “carry position” 
of the bucket.  
Each laser scan measurement took approximately 30 minutes (several hours faster 
than the specified manual method). An observed problem in preliminary experiments was 
the challenge of maintaining the bucket height at the same height throughout the 
experiment. Since the hydraulic lift arms release pressure over time, two small wooden 
support plates underneath the bucket kept its position in place for the duration of the 
measurement. There were no other moving parts that could have influenced the point 
cloud measurement. An additional issue with laser scanners is its potential for limited 
field-of-view (FOV). Most laser scanners cannot measure the bottom parts of an 
equipment cabin, such as the cab floor or operator chair.   
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All experimental tasks were executed using specifications and guidelines from 
both ISO codes 5006 and 14404-1 [124][125]. The experimental procedure differed in 
some aspects from the suggested ISO code 5006 manual measurement method. The 3D 
laser scanner emits a light source from one central location rather than using two light 
sources prescribed in the ISO code 5006. This method better simulates the visibility of an 
equipment operator positioned at one central location within the skid steer loader cab. 
Previous research indicates that emitting a light source from one location better simulates 
stereo or singleness vision which is more characteristic of human vision than two 
emitting light sources [204]. Unlike the ISO code 5006 method, the 3D laser scanner also 
allows the user access to visibility data from any point inside the cabin. Although the 
manual measurement method was replaced with a blind spot measurement tool, the 
experimental strategy, measurement dimensions, and results remained in compliance with 
the rules established by the ISO codes.  
 
5.4.2 Data Processing 
  The 3D point cloud blind spot data captured by the 3D laser scanner was 
processed through commercially available construction design software for analysis. All 
of the projected lasers scanning points were traced from the operator’s head position to 
detect if and where they intersected a piece of the equipment cab or other obstruction 
before touching the ground surface. If the projected laser scanning point intersected any 
obstructions before connecting to the ground surface, that point was deemed a blind spot.   
The volume outside of the equipment cab is divided into virtual cubes creating a 
3D grid.  Because the laser point cloud penetrates the virtual 3D grid, all of the point 
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cloud data passes through one of the virtual cubes. Based on the visible or non-visible 
status of the point cloud passing through any given cube, the entire cube converts to the 
same visibility status. The volume of each cube is projected as an area onto a two-
dimensional (2D) grid for analysis. These 2D grids are representations of the blind spot 
volume obtained by the laser scanner point cloud data. An average data processing time 
to evaluate the point cloud data and develop one blind spot maps is approximately 20 
minutes for an experienced person with a modern computer. The 2D grids created for 
each skid steer loader can be viewed in later section of this chapter.  
 
5.4.3 Blind Spots Identification 
The blind spots were identified based on the occupancy grid map achieved from 
the previous step. In addition, specific factors that were defined in ISO standards were 
computed to evaluate the design of the equipment cab. The terms and explanations of this 
section should be used to interpret the experimental results. 
 
Blind Spot Area(s): The invisible area(s) to the operator are shown by hatch marks in the 
drawings. 
 
Rectangular Box (RB): A rectangular box is drawn around the equipment. The lines of 
the box are located on the ground reference plane at a one meter distance from the outside 
rectangular boundary of the equipment. 
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Visibility Test Circle (VTC): A circle with a 12 meter radius located on the ground 
reference plane with its center vertically below the center point of the operator’s eye 
height level. 
 
Visibility Test Person (VTP): A test person with a 1.5 meter in height and 0.6 meters in 
(shoulder) width. 
 
Visible Angles (Lengths) on the Circumference: The angles and lengths on the 
circumferences of the 12 meter radius circle that is visible to the operator. 
 
Plan, Side, and Front Views: The blind spot diagrams are displayed from different 
perspectives. The drawings provided in the results section are not to scale. 
 
Figures 15 and 16 demonstrate how to interpret the figures in the results section of this 
paper. The specifications listed on Figure 16 for the side view are the same for the front 





Figure 15: Reading the plan view diagram 
 
Figure 16: Reading the side view diagram (same for front/rear and left/right views) 
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5.4.4 Allocation of the Design Inefficiencies 
Four different models of skid steer loader of different manufacturers were 
evaluated for equipment operator visibility. Many design details were incorporated into 
the blind spot measurement. For example, most skid steer loaders are designed with a 
metal grid around the operator’s cabin to prevent any worker to be pinned by the 
hydraulic arms. This metal grid was included in the blind spot measurements to evaluate 
its effect on the operator’s visibility. By evaluating different models of the same 
construction equipment, design characteristics for each model can be assessed and design 
suggestions that promote safety can be realized. Other pieces of construction equipment 
were also measured and are shown in Appendix B.  
 
5.5 Experimental Results and Discussion 
The experiments were conducted outdoors in an open environment. Each skid 
steer loader was placed on a flat concrete slab with no visual obstructions within a 12 
meter radius of the equipment cabin. The experiments were conducted during the daytime 
hours with no precipitation. The skid steer loaders and 3D laser scanner were static 
during the blind spot measurement experiment.   
The four models of skid steer loader selected for blind spot measurement had 
different structural features. The structural features of each skid steer model evaluated are 
the number of lift arms, entrance and exit locations, mobilization method, and window 
type.  Different features can create different visibility situations for the equipment 
operators. The same bucket was used for all measurements. The experimental results 
show figures obtained from the blind spot measurement tool and summary tables that 
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give numerical values of equipment operator visibility. Operator visibility measurements 
for other pieces of construction equipment are shown in Appendix B.  
 
5.5.1 Plan View Visibility 
Figure 17 displays the plan view of the laser scans for the four different models of 
skid steer loaders. The hatched areas denote non-visible areas to the skid steer loader 
operator. The color represents the reflectivity of the laser scanner signal, but has no 
impact on operator visibility. The size of the blind spot and the impact of any physical 
cab structure, including the metal mesh that previously was mentioned, can be seen. Skid 
steer loaders that have only one mesh (model C) or no mesh (model D) give higher 
operator visibility.  
Table 10 shows the visibility data calculated from the blind spot evaluation of 
each skid steer loader. The characteristics to each piece of equipment are available at the 
bottom of Table 10 for comparison. Numbers A though F, that are generated by the blind 
spot measurement tool, are used to demonstrate the size of visible and invisible areas to 
an equipment operator. To compare the different skid steer loaders, for example, the size 
of how much of the circumference is visible to an equipment operator are compared. 
















Table 10: Visibility data from the plan view of each skid steer loader 
Item Model A Model B Model C Model D 




































Visible length of 12 m circumference 
(E) 
34.7 m 43.4 m 53.3 m 58.1 m 
Length of entire circumference (F) 75.4 m 75.4 m 75.4 m 75.4 m 
Percent of visible circumference [E / F] 46.1 % 57.6 % 70.8 % 77.1 % 
Percent of blind spot [C / (A – B – C)] 47.6 % 40.0 % 31.9 % 30.2 % 
Percent of blind spot [D / (A – B – D)] 60.3 % 53.2 % 37.6 % 30.2 % 
Number of lift arms 2 2 1 1 
Entrance and exit locations Front Front Side Side 
Mobilization Tires Tires Tires Tracks 




5.5.2 Front and Rear View Visibility 
The diagrams in Figure 18 depict the operator visibility of the four different skid 
steer loader models through a detailed (A-A) view shown in Figure 16. They show the 
operator’s visibility of a 1.5 meter tall person at one meter distance at the front and the 
rear of the skid steer loader. The best performing equipment in front view is model D 
since 83% of a person standing in the front of the equipment is visible. The best 
performing equipment in rear view is model C with 31% visibility.  The numbers in 
parentheses denote the total percent visibility in front and rear view. For example, an 
equipment operator in model D can see 34% in the front/rear perspective (also referred to 




Figure 18: Rear and front view of laser scan data for different skid steer loaders 
 
5.5.3 Side View Visibility 
The diagrams in Figure 19 depict the operator visibility of the four different skid 
steer loader models through a detailed (B-B) view as shown in Figure 15. They show the 
operator’s visibility of a 1.5 meter tall person at one meter distance at the left and right of 
the skid steer loader. The best performing equipment in front view is model D since 
100% of a person standing to the left is visible. The best model with view to the right has 
model D with 65% visibility. The numbers in parentheses denote the total percent 
visibility in left and right view. For example, an equipment operator in model D can see 
62% in the left/right perspective (also referred to the B-B view). This percentage includes 
the sky light at the top of the equipment cabin. 
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Figure 19: Side view of laser scan data for different skid steer loaders 
 
5.5.4 Summary of Results 
Table 11 presents more data collected for each piece of skid steer loader. The bold 
values indicate the highest allowed operator visibility when compared to the other models 
measured. All italic numbers indicate a measurement that was close (less than 2%) apart 
from the highest visibility measurement. Table 11 summarizes the results of blind spot 
measurements projected onto the plan, front and rear, and side views for all skid steer 
loader models evaluated. 
Model D had the best overall operator visibility and the least percentage of blind 
spots.  Structural features such as a glass enclosed equipment cab or only one hydraulic 
arm could account for these visibility rates. Model D also has the best operator visibility 
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for an object in front of the equipment, followed closely by model B. Model D boasted 
the highest sum of all visible angles in the front/rear view, possibly because of the glass 
enclosed equipment cab.  
Model D has the greatest sum of all visible angles on the side view followed 
closely by model B and model C. Model C had the greatest visibility on an object in the 
rear of the equipment. This could be attributed to the sloped rear panel behind the 
equipment’s cab and the lack of a second hydraulic arm bracket in the rear of the 
equipment. In the side view, Model D had 100% visibility for an object on the left side of 
the equipment because it only has one hydraulic arm located on the right of the 
equipment. Model C has the similar single hydraulic arm configuration, and it 
experienced 98% visibility on the left side. Model D had the highest visibility on the right 













Table 11: Summary of results for all skid steer loader models 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Number of lift arms 2 2 1 1 
Entrance/exit locations Front Front Side Side 
Mobilization Tires Tires Tires Tracks 
Window type 






















Percent of blind spot (no metal grid) 47.6% 40.0% 31.9% 30.2% 









Percent of blind spot (metal grid) 60.3% 53.2% 37.6% 30.2% 
Sum of the lengths on the 12m 
circumference that are visible 
34.7 m 43.4 m 53.3 m 58.1 m 
Percent of the lengths on 12-m 
circumference that are visible 
46.1% 57.6% 70.8% 77.1% 
Visibility of an object in the front of the 
equipment 
74.4% 82.7% 78.5% 82.8% 
Visibility of an object in the rear of the 
equipment 
0.0% 11.5% 31.2% 21.5% 
Sum of all visible angles in the side view 116.2° 121.6° 121.6° 124.2° 
Visibility of an VTP on the left side of the 
equipment 
34.8% 28.3% 98.5% 100.0% 
Visibility of an VTP on the right side of the 
equipment 
33.5% 26.1% 63.9% 65.3% 
Sum of all visible angles in the front view 153.8° 151.1° 197.8° 222.2° 
 
Model C has the smallest equipment footprint at 6.2 m
2
 and model D had the 
smallest blind spot area. This model skid steer preformed best both with and without 
considering the metal grid around the operator cab. The skid steer models C and D 
replaced most or the entire metal protective grid (respectively) for an enclosed clear cabin 
casing. This allowed for better operator visibility simply because there was no metal grid 
blocking the operator’s LOS. 
The sum of all lengths that are visible in the 12 meter VTC circumferences ranged 
from 34.7 m (46%) to 58.1 m (77%). Higher values of the VTC circumferences are more 
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desirable because they show a higher visibility along the circumference. Model D had the 
highest VTC circumferences at 58.1 m or 77%. 
Model D had the highest visibility percentage (8%) of an object with a 1.5 meter 
height and at a distance of one meter from the front of the equipment followed closely by 
model B with 83%. Model C was the skid steer loader with the highest visibility at 31% 
of an object of 1.5 meter height and at one meter distance from the back of the 
equipment. The sum of all visible angles from the operator’s perspective from the front or 
rear ranged from 116.2 degrees to 124.6 degrees. Model D and model B tied for the 
highest visible angels at 126.6 degrees. 
The skid steer loader with the highest percentage of visibility of an object to the 
left side was model D at 100% followed by model C at 98%. Likewise, the maximum 
visibility of an object to the right side was 65% by model D followed closely by model C. 
The summary provided in Table 11 indicates that skid steer loader models evaluated with 
clear glass enclosed equipment cabins, only one hydraulic lifting arm, and slanting rear 
panel demonstrated the best operator visibility and the least amount of blind spot areas 
and spaces.  
 
5.5.5 Design Recommendations 
The blind spot measurement data presented provides valuable insights on how the 
design of skid steer loaders (and construction equipment in general) impacts equipment 
operator’s visibility. The experimental results can be analyzed to determine which design 
features provide the optimal visual situation for the equipment operator.  
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Best design practices for skid steer loaders based on the collected blind spot data 
are recommended. Many countries require that equipment manufacturer release blind 
diagrams before they can be commercially sold. Although Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) data might be used to optimize equipment design, equipment is often modified in 
the field. Since equipment is often altered in the field, measurement practices as suggest 
in this research, should be repeated regularly. They help equipment operators understand 
blind spots even with an equipment the operators might be very well familiar with 
already.  
The four skid steer loaders used for experiments all had different design 
characteristics. For example, models C and D were equipped with an operator side 
entrance while the other models have a front entrance. This very recent design change 
eliminated the dangerous front entrance for the operator above the skid steer loader’s 
bucket. Other models (for example, A and B) have an operator climb into the cabin from 
the front. This is simply an unfeasible practice by design, since operators potentially can 
trip over debris in the bucket or slip on flat but sharp metal surfaces caused by small 
hydraulic oil leakages.  
Models A and B have two hydraulic lifting arms, while model C and D only have 
one. By eliminating one hydraulic arm, visibility was greatly increased on one side of the 
skid steer loader. Every skid steer model had rubber tires except for model D which used 
rubber tracks. The influence of rubber tracks on the results was insignificant because of 
their low mounting position. Each model of skid steer loaders has different design 
elements such as the number and location of hydraulic loading arms. These design 
differences create different blind spot and visibility angles for the equipment operators. 
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From the blind spot measurement data and research findings, one can conclude 
that equipment design has a profound impact on blind spots of the equipment operator’s 
visibility. The following observations can be made from the data collected: 
 
 By substituting a clear enclosed equipment cabin for the existing metal grid, the 
skid steer loader operator experiences better visibility. 
 Skid steer loaders equipped with two hydraulic loading arms provide better 
visibility for operators when the hydraulic arms are positioned lower than the 
operator’s cab window.   
 One hydraulic arm instead of two allows for better visibility of objects on the side 
of the skid steer loader. 
 Large rear viewing windows and minimal obstructions on the rear allow the 
operator greater visibility of objects behind the equipment. 
 The rear panel of the equipment should be lower than the equipment cabin 
viewing window and slanted downward to provide the maximum visibility. 
 Skid steers are often used to lift materials above the height of the equipment.  
Operator visibility above the equipment cabin is imperative for safely loading and 
dumping materials. While maintaining the proper ROPS and FOPS systems, 
minimum obstructions at the top of the cabin increase visibility for the operator. 
 Equipment designers and manufacturers should be aware of typical blind spot 
areas and attempt to minimize the safety hazard through design characteristics of 
the skid steer loader.   
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 A blind spot measurement practice that is simple to use can provide reliable blind 
spot diagrams, in particular for equipment that has been modified in the field. 
Regulations and standards should address emerging technologies that allow for 
safer equipment design, manufacturing, and utilization. 
 
5.5.6 Validation 
 Visibility results from laser scanning were compared to the previously used light 
bar visibility measurement method [200]. Two models of steel drum rollers from the 
same manufacturer that were comparable in ground surface area coverage, operator 
position including height, and cab obstructions were compared using the measured blind 
spot area and the visible length circumference. Although the two rollers we not the same 
model, most of the equipment specifications were the same or very similar. The 
individual measurements and percent differences can be viewed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Operator visibility measurement results from different measurement 
methods 

















Cat CB 534C Laser scanning 57.8 m
2




Construction equipment fatalities account for approximately 25% of the total 
fatalities experienced in the construction industry [62]. A leading cause of these fatalities 
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is poor operatory visibility including blind spot areas which contribute to about half of 
the visibility-related fatalities in construction. The blind spots are created when an 
equipment operator’s LOS is obstructed by an object on both the construction equipment 
and in close proximity of the equipment. Many types of construction equipment are 
capable of numerous articulations which can create additional (or so called dynamic) 
blind spots for the equipment operator. Furthermore, the characteristics of a construction 
sites require that workers, material, and construction equipment operate in close 
proximity which can enhance the existing visibility issues for equipment operators. Any 
visibility-related issue including blind spots can create unsafe working conditions and can 
lead to injuries or fatalities.   
The major contribution of this chapter is a blind spot measurement technique 
based on laser scanning that follows existing international safety standards, but requires 
less effort and provides higher accuracy compared to existing manual techniques. These 
advantages were capitalized to measure the blind spots of four skid steer loaders. The 
resulting 3D blind spot diagram for each piece of equipment reflects the individual 
equipment design. The smallest blind spots for each equipment type represented the best 
design to promote safety while maintaining the highest operator visibility of the 
surrounding equipment work space. 
This work was limited in scope. Many equipment manufacturers now measure 
operator visibility using design software which does not require laser scanning or 
infrastructure to measure operator visibility [63].  The method presented in this chapter is 
more applicable to older construction equipment where no design model is available or 
construction equipment that has been modified in the field. A future study could 
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investigate and validate visualization of operator visibility through design software versus 
laser scanning or other applied operator visibility measurement methods.  
Another limitation of the research presented in this chapter is the absence of rear-
view mirrors. Rear-view mirrors are used as aids for equipment operators to visualize 
blind spot areas around the equipment. For this study, enhanced operator visibility from 
mirrors was not included in the blind spot measurement data. For further research, the 
impact of mirrors could be integrated into the operator visibility data. Although a laser 
scanner provides accurate 3D data even in small equipment cabs, a more complete 
validation of the approach including a scientific evaluation of the current standard 
measurement method is needed.   
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CHAPTER 6 
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGY FOR PROXIMITY DETECTION 
AND ALERT SYSTEMS FOR CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT 
OPERATION 
  
This chapter discusses the needs for a real-time proximity detection and alert system 
for construction sites. A summary of potential technologies and their applications is 
presented. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) was identified as a candidate technology 
and was further tested through experimental trials. Numerous field experiments were 
designed and conducted to emulate typical interactions between workers-on-foot and 
construction equipment. Occurrences of proximity breaches were also recorded and analyzed 
to identify hazards on construction sites.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Each construction site is characterized by a unique size and set of working 
conditions. Construction work environments are comprised of a mixture of multiple 
construction resources such as site personnel, equipment, and materials. Each of these 
resources performs a multitude of dynamic construction activities in a defined space and 
often requires they operate at close proximity to each other. When construction 
equipment is operating in close proximity to ground workers, a hazardous situation can 
be created. Contact collisions between ground workers and heavy construction equipment 
can increase the risk of injuries and fatalities for construction personnel.     
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Previous researchers have investigated the proximity issue in construction 
including injury and fatality statistics of collisions between construction equipment and 
workers. Because construction activities often involve many repetitive tasks, construction 
workers can experience decreased awareness [55]. A real-time proximity detection and 
alert system is needed on construction sites to warn equipment operators of hazardous 
proximity situations.   
Real-time safety technologies implemented on construction sites have been found 
capable of providing alerts to ground workers and construction equipment operators in 
real-time when a hazardous proximity issue is present [130]. These technologies can 
create a safety barrier and provide workers a “second chance” if another safety best 
practice is disregarded [130]. Some of these technologies are also capable of recording 
safety data that currently is not obtainable, such as near misses. By identifying and 
recording this data, new information sources are available to enhance construction safety. 
Currently, safety data collections are manually completed and are subject to human error 
[131]. However, several research ventures have investigated remote sensing technologies 
for potential use for material management strategies within the construction industry 
[132][133][134][135].    
A lack of scientific evaluation data currently exists for construction safety 
technologies such as proximity detection and alert systems including limited testing 
methods for evaluating these systems. Minimal information and data currently exists to 
evaluate how existing construction safety technologies can be implemented to warn 
construction personnel of the presence of hazardous proximity situations. Experiments 
designed to emulate the construction environment are required to evaluate these emerging 
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safety technologies. Data retrieved from these experiments can be used to demonstrate 
the validity and effectiveness of these safety technologies. 
Historically, construction companies have been slow to implement new 
technology and innovation in comparison to other industries [136]. When technology is 
implemented, standards are created for system manufacturers as well as construction 
companies who are the end users [137][138]. Other industry sectors in the U.S., such 
underground mining and railroad operations, have tested and began implementing various 
proximity detection technologies [130][139][140][141][142][143][144][145][146]. As 
demonstrated by these industry sectors, emerging safety technologies including real-time 
proximity detection and alert systems can be used to provide ground workers with alerts 
during hazardous proximity situations.    
  
6.2 Background 
A review of current construction safety practices specific to hazardous proximity 
issues is discussed. Technologies thought to be capable of providing alerts in real-time 
during hazardous proximity situations were reviewed specifically for their effectiveness 
to perform in the construction environment.  
 
6.2.1 Current Safety Best Practices 
Standards and regulations mandated by OSHA are imperative to improve safety in 
construction [147]. For example, during hazardous proximity situations, OSHA requires 
construction equipment to provide alerts when moving in the reverse direction [148]. 
These alerts can often desensitize workers by alerting workers when hazardous 
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conditions are not present [149][150][151]. Back-up alerts, along with other safety 
strategies, are incapable of preventing contact collisions between workers and 
construction equipment. Current safety regulations also require safety devices such as 
hard hats, reflective safety vests, and other personal protective equipment (PPE) [148]. 
These passive safety devices are incapable of alerting construction operators and workers 
in real-time during hazardous proximity situations. Other safety regulations such as safety 
training and education can increase the awareness of close proximity issues for 
construction operators and workers [32][40]. 
Much research has been performed with regards to safety behavior of construction 
workers [39][152][153]. CII monitored construction workers and later provided 
suggestions about safe and unsafe practices that were observed. The method provided 
near real-time feedback during the monitoring period for the construction workers [153]. 
Companies that implemented site-specific safety programs early in the project were 
found to experience better safety records than companies that did not [39]. The study 
found that increased efforts in front-end planning including design for safety can improve 
safety on construction projects.  
 
6.2.2 Real-time Proximity Detection and Alert Terminology and Methods 
Proximity detection and alert systems were evaluated based upon their feasibility 
to work in a construction environment, including cost, operating distance, and other 
parameters characteristic to construction projects. Excluded were technologies that are in 
the prototype stage, such as emerging range imaging technology [154][155][156]. The 
evaluated technologies include RFID, Ultra-Wideband (UWB), GPS, magnetic field 
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sensing, vision detection devices including video cameras, mesh radio systems, laser, 
sonar, and radar based proximity warning technologies. In order to evaluate these 
technologies effectively, defined the terminology was defined to understand the 
similarities and differences between each device [130]. 
 
 A proximity detection system is a system that detects a person or vehicle using a 
sensor 
 A proximity detection and alert system is a sensing system that provides an alert 
for equipment operators and ground workers when a hazardous proximity issue is 
detected 
 A collision avoidance system is the processing of data to information that results 
in signals or actions that alter equipment movement in an attempt to prevent a 
collision 
 Real-time is defined as highest possible signal update rate 
 Pro-active means a device that can warn workers or systems before accidents 
occur and have the potential to avoid incidents 
 
All technologies researched in this report are considered proximity detection or 
alert systems; however, few of these are classified as a true collision avoidance system. 
Each proximity detection and alert system technology can be characterized as a control 
technology, independent (stand-alone), cooperative system or a network system. The 
following categories are defined [157]: 
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 Control technology: A system that provides an equipment operator with more 
information (e.g., visually through mirrors or larger windows) 
 Independent (stand-alone) technology: A system that detects objects through 
sensing, but is incapable of identifying the location of the detected object. This 
technology is considered a passive system (e.g. back-up alarms) 
 Cooperative technology: A system that uses sensing and detection devices which 
communicate with each other. These devices are worn by workers and one 
component of the system is also placed on each piece of construction equipment 
 Network technology: A system that utilizes cooperative technology with other 
infrastructure pieces that allow all devices in the system to communicate with 
each other 
 
Different proximity detection and alert strategies exist and range from equipment 
operators and ground workers being alerted by an audible, vibration, or visual alarm to an 
entire piece of equipment shutting down because a worker is in too close proximity of 
that piece of equipment. Many of these devices use a combination of visual alerts, 
vibrating devices, flashing lights and audible alarms [105]. Some devices come for entire 
work crews and do not require equipping each worker with a device. The alert strategy 
mainly depends on the equipment and the site environment. 
 
6.2.3 GPS Based Proximity Warning 
GPS provides positioning information to workers, equipment, and materials. Past 
research has integrated GPS systems into construction equipment for safety zone hazard 
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analysis [158][159]. It uses antennas, receivers, and processors that communicate with 
satellites to determine a point location. This technology is considered a network system 
because the detection information is shared with all devices in the system and it requires 
infrastructure. The information is shared between all construction equipment through 
radios concerning safety exclusion zones, equipment location and path calculations to 
determine a potential collision area [157]. Other research has utilized GPS technology for 
tracking and locating construction materials [160]. Figure 20 depicts the different 
components of a GPS system on a construction project. 
 
 
Figure 20: GPS based proximity warning technology [157] 
 
It is possible to also equip construction workers with GPS devices, although high 
precision GPS devices for workers are relatively expensive when compared to other 
proximity detection and alert devices. The location of each piece of construction 
equipment is coupled with proximity warning and alert mechanisms. Based on too close 
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proximity (distance between two pre-defined objects is too small) the warning or alert is 
activated. Some GPS systems have the capacity to add coordinates and perform path 
calculations for construction equipment. By outlining a potential equipment path, workers 
can be notified of common travel ways of heavy equipment and thus avoid these areas. 
One major drawback of GPS is the high initial equipment cost. For most 
construction sites, the equipment cost is too expensive to be feasible to track every piece 
of construction equipment. Attempts have been made to combine GPS technology with 
other sources to decrease the overall project cost for using the GPS system. Combining 
RFID readers equipped with GPS technology [133] reduced the implementation costs, but 
problems with the detection range and number of passes required to identify the location 
were still present [161][162]. Another main drawback to GPS locating technology is its 
inability to locate objects underground or inside a building. The GPS satellites are most 
effective in locating objects on the ground surface with no obstructions (such as a tree or 
roof) between the object and the satellite. Additionally, GPS systems are unable to detect 
specific construction workers on foot. In order to be an effective proximity warning 
device, a network system must be small and cost-efficient enough to detect and 
communicate with every construction worker [157]. 
 
6.2.4 Magnetic Marking Fields 
The most dominant proximity detection technology used in a construction related 
field of underground mining is magnetic marker fields. This cooperative system uses a 
tag-based system of two-way communication between systems installed on mining 
equipment and detectors on mine workers. The magnetic marker field is generated by the 
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device either on the mining equipment or the worker, and its purpose is the monitor 
hazardous areas [157][161][162]. Figure 21 demonstrates the magnetic marker field 
being generated by a device located on the worker’s arm.  
 
 
Figure 21: Magnetic marker field generated on the worker and by the equipment 
[157] 
 
The signals are projected using very low frequency (VLF) or low frequency (LF) 
spectrum magnetic field. In other systems, very high radio frequency (VHF), ultra high 
frequency (UHF) or even a combination are used to generate the magnetic field. The 
readers are capable of detection, calculating distance between signals and identifying the 
source of the signal whether it is worker or equipment. The reader is able to calculate the 
distance through reading the signal strength; the greater strength means the source is 
close. 
NIOSH has developed a specific type of magnet marking field named the 
Hazardous Area Signaling and Ranging Device (HASARD). Because HASARD is an 
active system, it eliminates many nuisance alarms that are prevalent with passive 
proximity warning systems [165]. Many proximity systems with similar capabilities 
require a transmitted to be installed on one object and a receiver to be installed on another 
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object. On construction sites, the transmitter would be installed on a large piece of 
equipment and the receiver on a worker. This would allow the transmitter to detect the 
proximity of workers-on-foot and potentially avoid accidents. Receivers can be installed 
on things other than workers as well including road edges, poles, manholes, etc. This 
system allows for remote alarms, data logging and equipment shut-off features 
[165][166][167][168][169]. When a construction worker enters the magnetic field signal 
at a certain level, a detection alarm is triggered to the operator. 
 
6.2.5 Radar Based Proximity Detection and Warning 
Another proximity detection method uses RADAR (Radio Distancing And 
Ranging) to warn equipment operators of a construction worker nearby. RADAR is 
classified as an independent (stand-alone) system because it is typically incapable of 
identifying the type of object it is detecting. RADAR can sound the same alarm types if it 
detects a rock, tree, or worker. Typical RADAR alerts consist of an audible or visual 
warning, and some systems have incorporated both. Many of the systems are also 
coupled with an optional camera system that allows the driver to see what is in the 
RADAR beam area. A RADAR based proximity detection system emits a pulsed or 
continuous wave from the construction equipment. Multiple antennas can be positioned 
on the equipment to monitor the blind spot areas [157]. A depiction of a radar based 




Figure 22: Radar based proximity detection system for a haul truck [157] 
 
RADAR was found to be well suited for slow moving scenarios with short ranges 
(8 to 20 meters) [157]. Equipment mounted RADAR system can also be used for very 
short range object tracking up to 8 meters. Due to the range limitations, RADAR offers a 
feasible solution for smaller construction equipment. RADAR systems have also been 
found to occasionally produce a false alarm which can desensitize workers [157][170]. 
 
6.2.6 Mesh Radio System 
Using redundant positioning technologies, mesh radio networking detection 
systems are mainly used in the mining industry. This system requires a wireless mesh 
node on each piece of equipment enabling each node to act as an independent router. The 
radio signal moves from one node to the next through a dynamically interconnected 
system. The radio signal allows the entire vehicle fleets to communicate to their 
respective vehicle location information. As different pieces of equipment move in and out 
of range, the signal changes paths and uses signal strength to calculate distance between 
objects. Full knowledge of the position, velocity and heading of all vehicle units in the 
area become possible [171]. 
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“Caution” notifications are given to the operator when units are detected within a 
certain distance allowing the operator to be aware of the potential hazard. “Alert” 
notifications are also given to the operator when the situation calls for the operator’s 
immediate attention. The “Caution” and the “Alert” radii are configurable and dynamic 
meaning they can change with the location in the mine and speed of the equipment. For 
example, hauling trucks can have various alert zones throughout a work day depending 
on the construction operation and driving speed.  
This multi-sensor positioning gives the equipment operators situational awareness 
that is not just limited to GPS-equipped mobile equipment. That means the system has 
the power to reveal personnel working under haul trucks or even a mechanic in an engine 
compartment. Operators can be notified of potentially unsafe situations by way of a two 
color light bar that can easily be mounted to the dash. As an option, alarms can be 
installed to heighten awareness of alert situations.  
 
6.2.7 Camera and Vision Technology 
Intelligent video systems, as shown in Figure 23, can be used as a proximity 
warning device [146]. Computer-assisted stereovision cameras are capable detecting 
obstacles using 3D position information [172]. The camera gathers information and 
develops a 3D point cloud of the object detected. This technology has decreased in cost in 
the past few years [157][173]. Vision has been implemented in construction in other 
capacities including tracking construction resources and site progress monitoring 
[174][175][176][177][178][179].    
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Figure 23: Rear-mounted camera and on-board screen to cover rear blind spots 
[130] 
 
It was concluded that camera technology is capable of simultaneously providing 
two types of safety information: 1) Proximity detection and 2) blind spot visualization 
[157]. Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTV) installed inside construction equipment are 
connected to rear-mounted cameras so that operators receive a real-time visual image of 
the blind spot directly behind the equipment. 
Video cameras were found to be most beneficial when combined with other 
methods such as RADAR. Once alerted, the video camera allows the operator to see 
exactly what object is in the blind spot. A major disadvantage of having a screen of the 
video camera systems in the driver cab is that it can distract the equipment operator from 
its work task. Also, visibility of a camera system is limited during night time operation 
and when the camera lens is obstructed by dirt or dust.  
 
6.2.8 Radio Frequency Proximity Detection 
A need exists in the construction industry for a wireless, reliable and rugged 
technology that can identify the location construction workers, equipment, and materials. 
Technology with these specifications is also needed to provide a warning and alert signal 
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in real-time for construction workers in dangerous situations. Radio Frequency (RF) 
technology has proven to meet these construction jobsite requirements for safety 
[130][180][181]. 
RFID has been used in many capacities in other industrial sectors, and recently 
has entered the construction domain. Passive and active RFID tags have been used to 
monitor workers as they pass along the entry bridges to ships [179], in material and 
logistic efforts [162][183], site access [184], and also related to site safety [185][186]. 
RFID tags can store important security information about workers and enable an easy 
accounting mechanism of workers or search and rescue personnel during emergency 
situations [187]. 
RFID technology has been applied as a warning device in other industries as well. 
In manufacturing industries and warehouses, forklifts are required to operate in small 
spaces. To alert ground workers, UHF devices have been placed at corners that trigger an 
alarm when a forklift is in the proximity of the sensors. This technology allows for large 
mining equipment or small forklifts in warehouses to be tracked and monitored 
throughout the warehouse in an attempt to locate any potential dangerous situations 
[188][189]. RF technology is also used in the railroad construction [190] and alerts 
ground workers of hazards at recycling centers [191].  
Active RF technology uses VHF to project omni-directional signals into the field. 
Typically an antenna and battery is installed on the equipment or inside the equipment 
cab. A worker or crew is equipped with an individual or crew warning and alert device 
that triggers if the distance between personal devices and equipment mounted devices are 
closer than the pre-calibrated alert range. RF technology can: 
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 Activate real-time alert for operators 
 Provide a pro-active tool for managing risk 
 Add another layer of protection in the safety system 
 Operate (intrinsically) safe in most construction working environments 
 Easily transfer to other workers or to install on other pieces of equipment 
 
Some of the main limitations of RF technology include: 
 
 Requires a power source 
 Requires installation on workers, crews, and equipment  
 Is impacted by vehicle and environmental effects through RF multipath and site 
obstructions (see Figure 24) 
 
 
Figure 24: Ideal case including open, unobstructed, flat surface (left), Vehicle and 




6.2.9 Proximity Detection and Alert Technology Selection Summary 
A variety of proximity detection and alert technologies exist for a many 
applications. Most come with greater benefits that exceed the limitations. Some of these 
limitations need to be explored further, for example, measuring the proximity distance of 
the alert device, its coverage area, and the reaction of workers to the alert signal. Among 
other important tasks, an implementation strategy, investment in safety analysis (cost-
benefit), and some legal aspects should also be explored before technology becomes 
widespread in the construction industry. Table 13 provides a summary of the review of 
















Table 13: Summary of evaluating proximity detection and alert technology 
Technology needs to 
work from and for:  
 Person to equipment 
 Equipment to equipment 
 Equipment to work area  
 Area access control 
 Single worker or equipment to multiple crew or equipment 
fleet 
 Various equipment speeds and trajectories 
 Obstacle avoidance or stop movement of equipment 
Available technologies 
for proximity detection 
and alert systems: 
 (Stereo) Vision camera systems 
 Infrared 
 Ultrasonic 
 Magnetic field marking 
 Radar based systems 
 GPS 
 Lasers 
 RF tagging 
The success and 
effectiveness of 
technology is impacted 
by: 
 Distract driver 
 Constant cleaning 
 Heat or noise from equipment 
 False and nuisance alarms  
 Indoor environments 
 (Fixed) sensing infrastructure 
 Reliant on reflective surfaces (e.g. metal) 
 Varying alert ranges 
 Prototype stage and not fully evaluated 
Wireless technology 
shows the least 
limitations in a typical 
construction 
environment: 
 Operates in smoke, dust, and rain  
 Does not distract driver from normal operations 
 Real-time data collection 
 Safety zones are adjustable 
 Mobile technology 
 
Table 14 summarizes the benefits and limitations identified from the review of 
technologies though to be capable of providing an alert to workers and equipment 
operators during hazardous proximity situations.   
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Table 14: Benefits and limitations of candidate proximity detection technologies 
[144][192][154][193][194][195][196][197][198] 
Technology Benefits Limitations 
GPS  Minimal required infrastructure 
 Can function on outdoor sites 
without overhead obstructions 
 Not functional indoors 
 Not suited for short range 
detection 
Laser  High signal update rate 
 Capable of functioning in the 
construction environment 
 Not able to identify a ground 
worker from other objects 
 Only accurate for short range 
detection 
RADAR  Capable of multiple antenna 
integration 
 Can be used to supplement 
video 
 Not able to identify a ground 
worker from other objects 
 Only accurate for short range 
detection 
Sonar  Minimal infrastructure required 
 Low initial cost 
 Minimal detection range 
 Susceptible to elements in the 
construction environment 
UWB  System can identify a ground 
worker from other objects 
 Can function on  outdoor/indoor 
sites 
 Sizeable amount of infrastructure 
 High initial cost 
 
Vision   System can identify a ground 
worker from other objects 
 Capable of detection at various 
ranges 
 Poor visibility at night or in 
dusty areas 
 Line-of-sight segmentation 
 
 
6.2.10 Proximity Detection and Alert Systems Testing 
Several past research ventures have incorporated methods to evaluate the 
capabilities of proximity detection and alert systems. A camera and radar systems were 
mounted on a large capacity haul truck and proximity alert distances were manually 
marked and measured on the ground surface [205]. Trials included several activities 
typical of a large capacity haul truck in copper mining environments. The system 
detected obstructions approximately 30 feet in front and behind the haul truck.  
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A similar experiment deployed GPS systems on large capacity haul trucks and a 
base station was located on a nearby hill [173]. Several trials were performed to test the 
accuracy of the system to track three mobile vehicles and six stationary objects. The 
system was able to track all vehicles and objects while the haul truck performed typical 
activities in a surface mining environment. Other research integrated computer-assisted 
stereo vision with a radar detection system to potentially realize the benefits of a 
combined proximity detection and alert system [206]. Stereo cameras were mounted on 
the rear of an off-highway dump truck. Several field trials positioned a person and berm 
in the path of the truck to evaluate the system’s proximity detection and alert capabilities. 
 
6.3 Objective and Scope 
The primary objective was to evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of a RFID 
proximity detection and alert system in the construction environment. This system was 
previously identified as a potential candidate technology to provide alerts during hazards. 
The system should provide an alert in real-time to ground workers and construction 
equipment operators during hazardous proximity situations. When construction resources 
are in close proximity to one another, the sensing technology will detect the hazardous 
condition and activate an alarm to warn equipment operators through devices called 
Equipment and Personal Protection Units (EPU and PPU, respectfully). The scope 
includes proximity issues between heavy construction equipment and ground workers on 




6.4 Research Methodology 
The radio frequency technology proximity detection and alert system was 
evaluated through several experiments. Each experiment was designed to measure the 
performance of a proximity detection and alert system in a simulated outdoor 
construction environment. The set of experiments tested the device’s ability to detect and 
alert equipment operators of hazardous proximity issues while subjected to a simulated 
and active construction environment.  
The first experiment tested the proximity sensing devices in a mobile ground 
worker and static construction equipment scenario. The PPU was attached to a ground 
worker outside of the construction equipment and one EPU was placed inside the cabin of 
each tested piece of construction equipment. The ground worker equipped with the PPU 
device approached the piece of static construction equipment at a specified distance from 
many different approach angles. A theoretical safety zone was created by pre-calibrating 
the proximity detection and alert devices to various alert rangers. Positioning of the EPU 
device inside the construction equipment cab impacts the proximity range configuration, 
so the device was placed in a similar location on each piece of construction equipment.   
Similarly to the previous experiment, a static ground worker was equipped with a 
PPU device. An EPU device was installed on one piece of construction equipment. For 
each experiment, the construction equipment approached the static ground worker at a 
constant travel speed (16 kilometers per hour). After the alert was activated, the 
equipment operator halted the piece of construction equipment and the distance between 
the equipment’s stopped location and the static ground worker was measured. Because 
the proximity distance was measured after the equipment was stopped, the data 
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represented the minimal distance required to stop the equipment before it struck the 
ground worker. 
Each of the experiments was designed to evaluate a specific characteristic of the 
construction environment. The methods used for measuring proximity alert distances and 
data collection were held constant for all experiments. All OSHA construction safety 
regulations were followed while conducting experiments on active construction sites and 
only qualified construction equipment operators were used for testing.  
 
6.5 Experiments and Results 
Each experiment was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the tested 
proximity detection and alert system in the construction environment specifically to 
provide alerts to construction personnel when hazardous proximity situations exist 
between construction equipment and ground workers. Each experiment attempted to 
simulate functional characteristics of a typical construction site. The proximity detection 
system utilized for the experiments used a secure wireless communication line of VHF at 
approximately 434 MHz.      
 
6.5.1 Technology Tested 
RF technology was implemented for the proximity detection experiments. The 
system is made up of an in-cab device (EPU) for construction equipment and a personal 
device (PPU) for ground workers. The EPU device contains a single antenna, reader, alert 
mechanism and can be connected to the central power source of construction equipment. 
The PPU device consists of a chip, battery, and alarm and can be installed on the hard hat 
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of a construction worker. A signal broadcasted by the EPU is intercepted by the PPU 
when the devices are in too close of proximity which is defined by the calibrated alert 
distance. The signal is broadcasted by the EPU in a radial manner through an omni-
directional antenna and loses strength as the distance increases from the EPU location. 
The proximity range can be manually modified by the user to lengthen or shorten the 
range of which an alert is activated. When the PPU intercepts the radio signal, it 
immediately returns a signal and an alert is activated from the EPU in real-time.  
These proximity detection devices used have two different alert methods. 
Construction equipment operators in a hazardous proximity location can receive a visual 
and audible alarm. Equipment operators receive an alert through an audible alarm and 
visual flashing lights located on the device inside the equipment cabin. The audible alert 
creates enough noise so that operators are able to hear and distinguish the alert. The 
audible alarm is also different from other sounds and back-up alerts common to 
construction sites. The visual alerts provide more alert options because the operators can 
become desensitized to audible alerts. A series of red light-emitting-diodes (LED’s) 
activate upon a proximity breach. These lights are distinguishable among typical 
construction equipment controls. 
       The PPU’s and EPU’s were designed to be durable including sturdy casing 
capable of withstanding daily weathering. The PPU rechargeable battery power duration 
is approximately two work days. During the experiments, the proximity detection and 
alert system demonstrated similar signal strength throughout the battery’s duration. A 
small LED located on the PPU is activated when the device is charged and working. The 
EPU can connect directly to the battery source of a piece of construction equipment and 
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also displays a green LED when the system is functioning properly. The EPU unit can be 
installed in areas visible to the operator in the equipment cabin without obstructing the 
LOS to objects outside of the cabin.  
Proximity detection and alert systems are capable of four different alert scenarios. 
These scenarios describe the action of the technology when the construction ground 
worker is located a safe distance from a piece of construction equipment and when the 
ground worker is in a hazardous proximity situation. The hazardous proximity region 
around a piece of construction equipment is pre-defined and calibrated into the proximity 
detecting and alert devices. The following four scenarios can occur when using these 
systems on construction sites: 
 
True positive: An alert is activated when a ground worker is in too close 
proximity with a piece of construction equipment. 
False positive: An alert is activated when a ground worker is located at a 
safe distance from a piece of construction equipment (also 
referred to as nuisance alarms). 
True negative: An alert is not activated when a ground worker is located at 
a safety distance from a piece of construction equipment. 
False negative: An alert is not activated when a ground worker is in too 
close proximity with a piece of construction equipment.  
 
Of the four alert scenarios, false negative scenarios are the most problematic case 
because the technology fails to alert the construction equipment operator of the hazardous 
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proximity situation. False positives (also called nuisance alarms) are also undesirable 
because frequent non-hazardous alerts can desensitize equipment operators to potential 
hazardous proximity situations. Both true positive and true negative alerts are the most 
desirable alert scenarios because they accurately identify the status of proximity 
situations on construction sites. Figure 25 presents a flowchart of the four possible alert 
scenarios for the designed experiments.  
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Figure 25: Alert scenarios flowchart for proximity detection and alert systems 
 
6.5.2 Experiments Trials with Proximity Detection and Alert Devices 
A proximity detection device prototype was used based on the safety needs of the 
construction industry. This system was evaluated in two different experimental settings, 
each evaluating the performance and capabilities of different aspects of the system.  
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For the first experimental trials, an EPU device was placed in a simulated 
construction environment to evaluate the effectiveness of the proximity detection system 
in the outdoor field conditions. The test bed for these trials was a clear, flat, asphalt paved 
surface with no obstructions. A commercially available Robotic Total Station (RTS) and 
traffic control devices were used to create the test bed. The RTS was positioned at the 
center of a 15.2 meter radius circle, and traffic control devices were placed at 36 equal 
distant locations around the circumference of the circle. The traffic control devices were 
positioned at 10 degree offsets around the circle. Figure 26 shows the created 
experimental test bed. 
 
  
Figure 26: Coverage area experimental test bed 
 
The center point of the circular test bed served as the location for the EPU’s 
antenna component. The EPU was installed inside the equipment cabin (when applicable) 
in view and audible range of the operator. The antenna component of the EPU was 
mounted on top the operator’s side of the equipment at the highest point. The PPU was 
attached to the hard hat of a ground worker. Figure 27 shows the mounting positions of 
both the EPU and PPU.  
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Figure 27: Mounting positions of personal protection device (left), installing antenna 
on equipment (right) 
 
A test person wearing a hard hat equipped with a PPU approached each piece of 
construction equipment at a constant walking pace (2 meters per second) from 36 equal 
distance approach angles [207]. After the EPU device activated an alert, the worker 
stopped walking and measured the alert distance using a measuring wheel. This method 
was repeated twice for each approach angle and per piece of construction equipment. 
Three different personal detection devices with unique calibrated alert ranges were tested 
for each piece of equipment. This experimental procedure was performed using the 
following pieces of construction equipment: Grader, excavator, truck and trailer, pick-up 
truck, vibratory roller, dump truck, and forklift. 
The total sample size for each piece of construction equipment was 216 
measurements. A statistical analysis was performed on each subsample (every calibrated 
alert distance and piece of construction equipment) of measured alert distance. The data 
was also analyzed for false positive (also called nuisance alerts) and false negative 
readings. False negatives were defined as the worker striking the construction equipment 
before an alert was activated. Percentage values of activated alerts were also calculated 
for each piece of construction equipment tested. 
Table 15 shows results of the data analysis for the proximity detection alert 
distances of the test person approaching a static asphalt paver. The calibrated range 
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named “Range 2” recorded the lowest standard deviation and range discrepancy when 
compared to the other calibrated devices tested on the asphalt paver. Numbers denoted 
with bold text in Table 15 were the most precise performers of the three different alert 
ranges. 99.5% of the 216 worker approaches activated an alert from the system. In two 
cases, the worker struck the asphalt paver without activating an alert which was recorded 
as a false negative reading.     
 
Table 15: Statistical analysis of the alert measurements for the asphalt paver 
 Range 1 Range 2 Range 3 
Median 13.8 m 14.8 m 16.9 m 
Minimum Distance 0.0 m 10.3 m 12.2 m 
Maximum Distance 18.5 m 17.8 m 31.9 m 
Range 18.5 m 7.5 m 19.7 m 
Standard Deviation 2.7 1.7 3.4 
  
The obtained data from each piece of construction equipment was used to create 
proximity alert range graphs. These graphs display the recorded distant measurement 
from the worker’s position to the EPU antenna at the time the alert is activated. Figure 28 
shows the recorded alert distant measurements of the medium alert range personal 
protective device. The two lines represent the two different trials from each approach 
location with the medium alert range device. System coverage maps for other pieces of 





Figure 28: Active proximity warning zone for a specific alert range 
 
In some cases, two EPU’s were required to create a coverage area that extended 
radially around each piece of equipment. Two EPU’s were used because the coverage 
area for one EPU was inadequate to provide alerts for each approach angle around the 
piece of construction equipment. Two antenna components of two different EPU devices 
were mounted on top of a forklift at the highest point on the equipment while the PPU 
was still attached to the worker-on-foot as was done in the previous experiment. These 
configurations can be viewed in Figure 29.  
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Figure 29: Mounting position of an EPU antenna on the forklift (left); a second EPU 
antenna mounting position on the forklift (right) 
 
Similarly to the previous experiment, a ground worker wearing a hard hat 
equipped with a PPU approached the forklift at a constant walking pace from 36 equal 
distance approach angles. After the EPU device activated an alert, the worker stopped 
walking and measured the alert distance using a measuring wheel (see Figure 30). This 
method was repeated three times for each approach angle.  
 
 
    Figure 30: Measurement of the alert distance 
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The total sample size for the forklift tests was 108 measurements. A statistical 
analysis was performed on the measured alert distance. The average value of the three 
trials was used to perform the statistical analysis. Results of the data analysis for the 
proximity detection alert distances of workers approaching a static forklift are: Median = 
9.7 meters, Range = 11.8 meters, and Standard Deviation = 3.2 meters. The system 
recorded no false negative readings meaning the alert was activated on every approach.  
The obtained data from these trials was used to develop proximity alert range 
graphs. These graphs display the recorded distant measurement from the worker’s 
position to the EPU antenna at the time the alert is activated. Figure 31 shows the 
recorded alert distant measurements of the proximity detection and alert system.  
 
 
Figure 31: Forklift proximity warning zone for a calibrated alert range 
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 The EPU devices were installed on several other pieces of heavy construction 
equipment. The same coverage area tests as previously described were used to evaluate 
the proximity detection and alert devices. Three different calibration ranges were tested 
on each piece of equipment. The calibration range with the highest percent coverage area 
was chosen as the calibration range for that piece of construction equipment. If all three 
calibration ranges provided total coverage around the piece of heavy construction 
equipment, the range with the smallest standard deviation of the three was selected. A 
statistical analysis for the selected calibration range for each piece of heavy equipment is 
shown in Table 16. False positive values were defined as the number of alert range 
distances greater than three times larger than the inner quartile range added to the upper 
quartile range value. False negative values were the number of times the test person 
contacted the heavy equipment before an alert was activated. Each calibration range has a 
sample size of 72 measurements (time constraints only allowed for two trials per each 
approach angle). 
 
Table 16: Statistical analysis of proximity alert range for various pieces of 
construction equipment 






Forklift 9.7 m 11.8 m 3.2 0 0 
Wheel Loader 10.9 m 13.6 m 3.9 1 0 
Grader 8.6 m 12.8 m 3.2 3 3 
Asphalt Paver 14.7 m 7.5 m 1.7 0 1 
Excavator 11.7 m 41.9 m 10.7 3 5 
Truck and Trailer 7.2 m 13.0 m 9.4 0 2 
Pick-Up Truck 8.4 m 22.5 m 4.8 8 0 
Vibratory Roller 20.1 m 31.1 m 9.2 0 0 
Mower 12.1 m 15.1 m 3.4 0 0 
Dump Truck 16.0 m 22.2 m 6.0 2 0 
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A separate set of field experiments were conducted to test the effectiveness of the 
proximity detection devices on mobile equipment and static workers. These tests were 
completed on a flat, unobstructed paved surface similar to the previous field experiment. 
The EPU was installed in a pick-up truck with the antenna mounted on top of the truck’s 
cab on the driver’s side. A static ground worker equipped with a PPU was positioned next 
to the RTS, and was aligned on a straight path with the pick-up truck. Traffic control 
devices were spaced five and ten meters along the truck’s straight trajectory towards the 
ground worker. 
After maintaining a constant speed of 16 kilometers per hour (about 10 miles per 
hour), the truck driver stopped the vehicle after the alert triggered. As done in the 
previous field experiment, three different proximity detection devices with varied alert 
ranges were tested in this experiment. Each of the three different alert ranges was tested 
32 times providing results within a 95 percent confidence interval [118]. Box plots of the 
three different ranges and 96 data points gathered from this experiment are shown on the 
right side of Figure 32. All trials resulted in true positive alerts. No false alerts or 
nuisance alerts occurred during any of the 96 trial runs. 
 
Figure 32: Box plot of proximity detection distance for each PPU 
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6.5.3 Data Recording 
In addition to the location distance measured by the research team during all 
experimental trials of the presented testing method, the proximity detection and alert 
system has data recording and logging capabilities. During the previously described 
experiments, the system recorded the ground PPU device number, timestamp, and date of 
each proximity breach. A proximity breach included all instances in which a construction 
ground worker entered or exited the pre-calibrated hazardous proximity range around a 
piece of construction equipment. The column titled “Level” indicates the relative distance 
at which the system trigged an alert to the equipment operator. This value is specific to 
the proximity detection and alert system deployed for these experiments and it is used for 
calibrating specific system devices based on their relative distance and signal strength 
from other devices. The column titled “Status” denotes if the worker entered (“Trip”) or 
exited (“Clear”) the pre-defined proximity distance of a piece of construction equipment. 
The sample output of the data logged during the coverage area experiments of the asphalt 










Table 17: Sample output data of recorded proximity breaches 
Tag ID Level Date Time Status 
34 681 4/18/12 16:24:29 Trip 
34 625 4/18/12 16:24:29 Clear 
34 737 4/18/12 16:24:31 Trip 
34 581 4/18/12 16:24:45 Clear 
34 648 4/18/12 16:24:46 Trip 
34 540 4/18/12 16:24:47 Clear 
34 649 4/18/12 16:25:21 Trip 
34 539 4/18/12 16:25:42 Clear 
34 708 4/18/12 16:25:42 Trip 
34 599 4/18/12 16:25:42 Clear 
34 657 4/18/12 16:27:18 Trip 
34 600 4/18/12 16:27:18 Clear 
34 680 4/18/12 16:27:19 Trip 
34 588 4/18/12 16:27:19 Clear 
34 683 4/18/12 16:27:20 Trip 
34 607 4/18/12 16:28:10 Clear 
34 689 4/18/12 16:28:10 Trip 
 
Information from this system was exported into a database for further analysis. 
Individuals involved with a large amount of proximity breaches when compared to co-
workers were highlighted. From this point, construction safety managers can further 
explore details of the proximity breach by monitoring the individual on the project site 
and provide further safety training specific to hazardous proximity issues to select ground 
workers and equipment operators. Construction safety personnel can also use this tool to 
provide preventative safety training by reviewing past recorded data and informing 
ground workers and equipment operators of past hazardous proximity situations during 
certain construction activities.    
The proximity breach range of the tested proximity detection and alert system are 
calibrated and function based on relative distances, or the distance from the PPU to the 
EPU relative to other detected devices. Proximity breach data for the both stages of the 
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construction field condition trials were recorded and analyzed. The relative distance at 
which the PPU device was detected can be viewed in Table 17 under the column heading 
“Level.” An alert was triggered (trip condition) or silenced (clear condition) by the EPU 
at these relative detected distances. Results indicate that physical features of construction 
equipment impact the correlation between the desired calibrated relative distance and the 
actual triggered alert relative distance. Table 18 shows an analysis of the calibrated alert 
distances and actual alert distances for the construction field condition trials using the 
normal distribution. For each of these trials, the PPU were calibrated as follows: Range 1: 
640, Range 2: 580 and Range 3: 515. The software allows for calibrated relative alert 
distances between 0 and 1000.  
 







of alert level 
Range 1 590.1 317 32.5 
Range 2 575.7 118 19.8 
Range 3 546.6 398 34.2 
 
6.5.4 Validation 
 To better understand the impact of construction equipment components on the 
project signal from proximity detection and alert systems, the system was deployed in a 
clear, flat, unobstructed environment. The EPU antenna was mounted on a wooden tripod 
and the PPU was mounted to a test person’s hardhat as described in the previous 
experiment. Experimental trials were conducted similar to the previous experiment in 
which the test person approached the EPU tripod twice from 36 equal distant approach 
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angles at a constant walking speed (2 meters per second). The proximity detection and 
alert system was calibrated to “Range 2” as discussed in the previous experimental trials. 
The median recorded alert distance was 14.9 meters, the range was 1.8 meters, and the 
standard deviation was 0.47. For this trial, no false positive or false negative alerts were 
recorded.  
  
6.5.5 Limitations, Future Work, and Application Areas 
The objective was to evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of a proximity 
detection and alert system used in the construction environment. After completing the 
experiments, the trials revealed limitations to the proximity detection and alert system. 
Many parameters and potential influences on the system should be evaluated through 
future experimentation. Future studies should include the following: 
 
 Impact of temperature, humidity, precipitation and other ambient influences on 
warnings and alerts, and in particular on use of batteries on PPUs, 
 Location and mounting positions of the EPU’s and PPU’s, 
 Specific configuration and placement of PPU - device must be minimally 
intrusive on the worker and must perform reliably to active alerts.  
 Reaction of ground workers and equipment operators to implementing the 
devices, 
 Calibration of specialized alert distances for individual pieces of construction 
equipment including operator and ground worker reaction time, operator brake 
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distances, ground surface preparation, weather conditions and object mitigation 
strategy, 
 Record and analyze “near-miss” data to improve education construction workers 
on proximity issues, 
 Identify in real-time and record the position and trajectory of the hazard,  
 Analysis of calibrated alert distances and actual alert distances on various pieces 
of construction equipment in different environmental settings including obstacles 
blocking the line-of-sight between the PPU and EPU, 
 Collect and analyze “nuisance alerts” to evaluate reliability of system, 
 Create an implementation strategy for proximity detection systems in 
construction, and 
 Extended construction field trials with the proximity detection devices. 
 A return on investment of proximity detection and alert devices implemented onto 
construction sites. A case study with one company and five years of worker 
accident data and the previously described RF proximity detection and alert 
system revealed a return on investment value of 4.5.  
 
Illnesses, injuries and fatalities resulting from hazardous proximity issues can 
become very expensive after summing medical costs, insurance costs, productivity 
decrease resulting from time lost, and possible litigation costs. Some of these costs could 
potentially be avoided by implementing emerging safety technologies such as real-time 
proximity detection and alert systems. This safety technology can improve safety on 
 128 
construction sites by giving construction equipment operators a warning during a 
hazardous proximity situation. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
Current safety practices for proximity issues in construction have proven 
inadequate as demonstrated by the number of fatalities, accidents, and illnesses resulted 
from proximity issues. The ultimate goal of the construction industry must be to achieve 
zero accidents and injuries for all construction sites. The purpose was to evaluate the 
capabilities of a proximity detection and alert system to function in the construction 
environment both reliability and effectively when construction resources (e.g. workers 
and equipment) are in too close proximity. Results obtained from the review and 
experiments suggest that the proximity sensing and alert systems can be effective in 
certain situations and can potentially improve equipment-worker safety in construction.  
The proximity detection and alert system demonstrated its ability to perform by 
detecting the presence of hazardous proximity situations on construction sites. The 
designed experiments tested different pieces of construction equipment including a 
grader, excavator, truck and trailer, pick-up truck, vibratory roller, forklift, dump truck, 
and asphalt paver. In nearly all trials, the proximity detection system was able to detect 
and activate an alert when construction resources were in too close proximity to each 
other. In one instance, the radio frequency signal was blocked by a metal exhaust pipe 
which indicates multiple antennas should be installed on a piece of construction 
equipment to cover all signal blind spots. The audible alerts were to a sufficient volume 
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to be heard over back-up alarms and other general and loud construction noise. The 
equipment operator was also able to see the visual alert provided by the EPU.  
Although the field trials with the proximity detection and alert system were 
deemed successful, the experiments revealed other parameters that could potentially have 
an influence on the system, specifically the signal propagation and orientation of PPU. 
When the LOS between the PPU and EPU was obstructed by a component of the 
construction equipment, the devices were sometimes unable to communicate and detect 
the presence of the PPU. The overall system alert distance should eventually be 
optimized such that a ground worker and equipment operator are only alerted when a 
hazardous condition exists. For example, the proximity sensing technology could be 
calibrated such that an alert only occurs when a ground worker enters an equipment 
operator blind spot.   
Some research has investigated the use of autonomous construction equipment 
control that allows for operator-less construction equipment [116][117]. The work 
presented allows for immediate retrofit on construction equipment where autonomous 
construction equipment operation requires further investigation of how construction 
equipment can interact autonomously with or without the presence of ground workers on 
construction sites.  
Human physiology and worker response to alerts also would be required for 
further investigation related to implementing proximity detection and alert systems into 
the construction site environment. Specifically, researchers should specifically identify 
optimized hazard alerting methods for construction workers. By identifying the most 
effective alert methods, technology can be equipped with these alert devices and further 
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enhance safety for construction site personnel. These barriers along with others require 
further investigation to better evaluate the effectiveness of implementing proximity 






POSITION AND ORIENTATION OF (SEMI-) PASSIVE RFID PPU’S 
  
Hazardous proximity conditions and situations exist when heavy construction 
equipment is operating in close proximity to ground workers. The objective of this 
research described in this chapter is to evaluate the capabilities and reliability of (semi-) 
passive RFID technology when used for proximity sensing in the construction 
environment. Experiments emulating typical movements of ground workers are designed 
and executed. Various positions and orientations of the designed (semi-) passive RFID-
based PPU were evaluated based on typical ground worker movements during 
construction tasks. Results indicate that both position and orientation of the PPU impact 
the reliability of the system’s ability to activate alerts during hazardous proximity 
situations. The overall purpose of this research described in this chapter is to generate 
scientific data and knowledge of proximity detection and alert system for eventual 
implementation of these systems on construction sites. Limitations of RFID technology 




The dynamic nature of each construction site often requires multiple construction 
resources including personnel and heavy equipment to operate within close proximity to 
one another. Chapter 6 identified RFID technology as a potential candidate for providing 
real-time alerts to construction site personnel when construction resources (ground 
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workers and construction equipment) were in too close proximity to one another. Benefits 
of RFID technology have been leveraged in several U.S. industrial sectors including the 
construction industry. However, the harsh working environment that is characteristic of 
construction projects can present barriers for the functionality of RFID technology. For 
this research, experimental trials designed to simulate the movement required of ground 
workers on construction sites were used to evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of 
RFID technology functioning in the construction environment.  Results describe realized 
limitations of RFID technology for proximity detection and alert systems when deployed 
in the construction environment.  
 
7.2 Background 
Construction sites often have limited workspace requiring construction resources 
to function in close proximity to one another. As construction injury and fatality statistics 
show, these work environment conditions result in dangerous proximity situations for 
ground workers. Proximity issues remain a key problem in the safety of workers on 
construction projects.  
RFID technology (both passive and active systems) has been tested for many 
applications both in construction as well as other industries. Construction utilization of 
RFID technology include construction tool tracking [208], personnel tracking [185], 
material tracking [162], and construction site safety applications [186]. Basic feasibility 
tests for RFID technology were completed for proximity sensing applications in the 
mining environment which has similar conditions to typical construction sites [205].  
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 A lack of scientific evaluation data exists for RFID technology used for safety 
applications on construction sites. Specifically, combinations of mounting positions and 
orientations for components of proximity detection and alert systems are required. This 
evaluation should be accomplished through current or newly developed experimental 
methods, case studies, and data analysis.  
 
7.3 Objective and Scope 
The objective is to evaluate the reliability of various positions and orientations of 
passive RFID technology as a potential detection component in PPU devices. As part of a 
proximity detection and alert system, its function is activating an alert in real-time to 
construction personnel when they get in too close proximity to an antenna deployed on a 
piece of construction equipment. The different positions and orientations of passive RFID 
for PPU were tested using simulated ground worker movements towards commercially-
available components of a passive RFID tag-antenna system. 
 
7.4 Research Methodology and Results 
All experimental trials were designed to generate evaluation data detailing the 
effectiveness of various passive RFID tag positions and orientations for a PPU within a 
proximity detection and alert system. The PPU was mounted at various locations and 





7.4.1 Technology Evaluated 
The real-time proximity detection and alert system evaluated during these 
experiments utilizes active UHF technology to detect proximity breaches of construction 
equipment and ground workers. If two or more construction resources are in too close 
proximity, the sensing technology will activate an alarm to warn construction personnel 
through EPU’s and PPU’s. The EPU is equipped with a reader, alert mechanism, and 
single directional antenna that transmits and receives PPU information during a proximity 
breach such as a timestamp, PPU identification number and magnitude of the reflected 
radio frequency signal. The PPU is equipped with an alert mechanism, chip, and battery. 
This device can be installed on a worker’s hard hat or safety vest. The PPU surface area 
dimensions are 5.5 centimeters by 8.5 centimeters and the thickness is minimal. The PPU 
is flexible and can be attached to solid objects. Both the EPU and PPU device scan be 
viewed in Figure 33.   
Power is supplied to the EPU component of the proximity detection device 
through the existing battery on the piece of equipment. The PPU intercepts and reflects 
back a broadcasted signal from the EPU which instantaneously activates an alert in real-
time when devices are in close proximity to one another. The audible alert triggered by 
the EPU creates ample noise so that the equipment operator is able to hear the alert above 
sounds typically to construction sites. Figure 33 shows the EPU installed on a tripod (left) 
and PPU mounted on a worker’s safety vest (right).  
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Figure 33: Proximity detection and alert system: EPU (left) and PPU (right) 
 
The signal broadcasted by the EPU is projected in a radial manner and loses 
strength as the PPU moves farther from the EPU location. The signal strength emitted by 
the EPU remained consistent throughout the experimental trials. The EPU’s antenna was 
installed in locations where the LOS between the EPU and PPU was not obstructed. The 
proximity detection and alert system evaluated is also able to log data concerning PPU 
proximity breaches. The data logging function records the PPU and EPU identification 
number as well as the timestamp and Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) for 
each proximity breach.  
 
8.4.2 Experiments and Results 
The objective of the designed and executed experiments was to assess the 
performance of a proximity detection and alert system using RFID technology when the 
PPU was positioned and oriented at multiple angles. All experimental trials were 
performed in an outdoor environment with mostly clear and mostly sunny weather 
conditions with a temperature of 75 degrees Fahrenheit. A clear and flat grass ground 
surface with no obstructions was used for a test bed for these trials. A RTS was used to 
position markers along a straight path perpendicular to the face plane of the EPU antenna. 
As displayed in Figure 34, the markers (centerline) were placed at three meter intervals to 
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outline the walking path of a test person towards the antenna. In later experiments a test 
person approached the antenna from angles within its field-of-signal (FOS), which was 
approximately 30 degrees to each side of the centerline. 
 
 
Figure 34: PPU position and orientation test bed 
 
The EPU’s antenna component was mounted on a tripod with the face plane 
perpendicular to the ground surface. for the experimental trials. The EPU antenna is 
capable of reading 60 degrees in direction parallel to the antenna’s face plane. The 
antenna’s centriod was postioned 1.15 meters vertically from the ground surface. This 
vertical distance represented the average elevation between the top of test person’s hard 
hat and center of the test person’s safety vest. Although the mounting postion of the 
antenna can vary on equipment, testing with other heights was not performed. 
The test person equipped with a semi-passive RFID tag for the PPU began 
walking outside of the proximity range (approximately 40 meters from the EPU) along 
the path outlined by the markers. The test person maintained a constant walking pace of 
approximately 2 meters per second until an alert was activated [205]. The test person 
stopped and measured the distance from the stopped position to the EPU’s antenna 
position. Each combination of tag position and orientation was conducted ten times.   
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 A total of eight PPU position and orientation combinations were tested. For the 
purposes of this research, the term “position” refers to the location of the face plane of 
the device in relation to the ground surface. For example, the horizontal position is 
achieved by the face plane of the device being parallel to the ground surface and 
perpendicual to the EPU antenna face. Likewise, a vertically positioned tag has the face 
plane perpendicular to the ground surface and parallel to the EPU antenna face. Figure 35 
shows both of these tag positions where the device is mounted on a hard hat in the 
vertical position (left) and horizontal position (right).  
    
Figure 35 PPU mounted on a hard hat in the vertical position (left) and the 
horizontal position (right) 
Four PPU orientations were used in combinations with the previously described 
PPU positions. The orientations were based on the location of the PPU in relation to the 
EPU antenna or the sky. Each of the four PPU oritenations were assigned a number (1, 2, 
3, or 4) depending on the location of the PPU. Figure 39 presents a diagram to show how 
each numbered orientation was related to the EPU’s antenna or sky and ground reference. 
Three different of the same type of tag were evaluated at the eight combinations of 
position and orientation. 
Table 19 gives results of the statistical analysis of the alert distance results from 
the PPU positioned horizontally and mounted on top of the test person’s hard hat. The 
value of the mean, minimum alert distance, range (which is the statistical maximum value 
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subtracted from the statistical minimum value), and standard deviation of the alert 
disatnces were calculated from the ten trials of each PPU. In an optimized situation, the 
tolerance of distance alert range values should be minimal indicating high reliability for 
the proximity detection and alert system. Values of the highest mean, and the lowest 
range and standard deviation (bolded in Table 19). Other experiments with the PPU 
attached to the worker’s hard hat are shown in Appendix D. Table 19 also demonstrates 
the significant difference of the mean and minimum value when changing the orientation 
of the PPU (a worker during 90 degrees from the original position facing the EPU 
antenna).   
 




Table 19: Semi-passive PPU orientations mounted on top of a hard hat 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 37.7 m 38.8 m 37.8 m 
Min.: 36.8 m 38.0 m 37.0 m 
Range: 1.3 m 1.5 m 1.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.6 0.8 0.7 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 21.9 m 10.8 m 11.3 m 
Min.: 19.0 m 10.0 m 9.5 m 
Range: 5.8 m 1.5 m 3.0 m 
Std. Dev.: 2.9 0.8 1.6 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 34.1 m 12.7 m 37.4 m 
Min.: 32.0 m 12.0 m 36.3 m 
Range: 4.3 m 1.5 m 2.8 m 
Std. Dev.: 2.1  0.8 1.4 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 13.5 m 12.3 m 12.6 m 
Min.: 9.8 m 11.0 m 11.5 m 
Range: 5.5 m 2.8 m 5.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 3.0  1.4 2.7 
 
Orientiation 1 or PPU 1 and 3 recorded the highest mean value, lowest range, and 
the lowest value for the standard deviation. Data was collected and analyzed for 
following eight individual configurations of vertical position: (1) side of hard hat, (2) 
front of hard hat, (3) back of hard hat, (4) front pocket of safety vest, (5) back pocket of 
safety vest, and (6) side of shoulder; and horizontally positioned, (7) top of worker hard 
hat, and (8) top of shoulder.  
Values of the highest mean, highest minimum, lowest range, and lowest standard 
deviation values of each semi-passive RFID tag tested position and orientation 
configuration was identified from the four configurations tested on the hard hat (see 
Table 20). A similar table was created to summarize the results from experimental trials 
completed using the safety vest. Results of these tests are shown in Appendix D. In Table 
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20, the top performers have bolded values, and the top performing orientations of each 
PPU is noted in parenthesis to the right of each value. 
 
Table 20: PPU orientation summary on the hard hat 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Top 
Mean: 37.7 m (1) 38.8 m (1) 37.8 m (1) 
Min.: 11.5 m (4) 10.0 m (2) 12.5 m (2) 
Range: 1.3 m (1) 1.5 m (1) 1.3 m (1) 
Std. Dev.: 0.6 (1) 0.8 (1) 0.7 (1) 
Side 
Mean: 8.9 m (1) 5.7 m (1) 8.6 m (3) 
Min.: 1.5 m (3) 4.3 m (2) 4.5 m (2) 
Range: 1.0 m (1) 1.5 m (2) 5.3 m (2) 
Std. Dev.: 0.5 (1) 0.3 (3) 0.8 (2) 
Front 
Mean: 36.5 m (1) 38.2 m (1) 38.4 m (1) 
Min.: 4.5 m (4) 5.0 m (4) 12.5 m (4) 
Range: 3.0 m (1,2) 0.5 m (3) 1.5 m (2) 
Std. Dev.: 1.5 (1) 0.3 (3) 0.8 (2) 
Back 
Mean: 10.8 m (2) 28.8 m (3) 26.8 m (3) 
Min.: 2.0 m (4) 3.0 m (4) 4.0 m (2) 
Range: 1.3 m (2) 6.3 m (3) 7.8 m (3) 
Std. Dev.: 0.7 (2) 0.3 (4) 1.0 (1) 
 
Orientation 1 mounted on top of the hard hat recorded the highest mean value 
when compared to the other tested configurations. When mounted on the side and front of 
the hard hat, orientation 3 experienced the lowest value of standard deviation. When 
mounted on top of the hard hat, the tag had the highest number of top performing 
orientations when compared to the other configurations tested. The front mounting 
position had similar values to mounting the tag on top of the hard hat. The largest mean 
value was recorded when placing the  tag in the front pocket of the vest.  
Further data analysis showed that tag orientations 1 and 3 on the top and front of 
the hard hat were the best performers when compared to the other configurations 
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evaluated. When mounted on the safety vest, orientations 1 and 3 had the highest alert 
distance. Other trials of mounting the PPU on the shoulder and back of the safety vest 
resulted in false negative alerts meaning the test person was able to reach the EPU 
antenna before an alert was activated. Polarization effects were experienced when the 
PPU was positioned vertically in orientation 2 and 4, locations that could prove benefical 
for other worker movements such as bending. In summary, tag position and orientation of 
(semi-) passive RFID tags played a key role in succesfully detecting the tag by the reader. 
The results demonstrate that deploying a single (or multiple) tag(s) may result in false 
negative alerts.  
More testing is required for these tag locations such as a test person approaching 
the EPU antenna while positioning his/her body such that their back is facing the EPU 
antenna. Multiple tags can also be mounted on the worker hard hat and safety vest to 
better cover all approach angles. Further research is also required to evaluate potential 
external influences on the system such as the EPU antenna mounting location, impact of 
other construction resources, and various calibrated alert ranges. Data that is recorded and 
analyzed from these systems can improve safety site layout and assist in the development 
of new safety concepts for worker safety training. 
 As mentioned previously, three PPU tags were used during the experimental 
trials. Each PPU was calibrated to the same alert distance. A separate set of trials were 
performed to capture discrepancies between the three tested PPU tags. The same 
experimental test bed was used, however the PPU tags were held by the test person in 
position 1. The test person walked at the same speed in the same direction (in a straight 
 142 
path towards the EPU antenna) and recorded the distance once an alert was activated. 
Table 21 shows a statistical analysis performed on these trials.  
 
Table 21: Results of PPU trials  
 PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Median 38.3 m 34.2 m 36.1 m 
Minimum  34.5 m 33.6 m 32.1 m 
Range 2.0 m 1.5 m 1.8 m 
Standard Deviation 0.4 0.2 0.7 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
Collsions between ground workers and construction equipment or objects is one 
of the leading causes of fatalities in construction. The purpose of this research was to 
evaluate the effectiveness and capabilities of various configurations of (semi-) passive 
RFID tags used for electronic personal protective device postions and orientations. 
Results from the review and experiments indicate that proximity detection and alert 
systems that systems relying on passive RFID position and orientation impact the 
effectivness of these systems. The major shortcoming that was identified through the 
field trials is that commercially existing (semi-) passive RFID tags, based on its two-
dimensional antenna design, may not be suitable for reliable implementation in PPU 
safety systems unless all potential worker-to-equipment poses and positions can be 
covered. Although existing construction research on active and passive RFID technology 
has shown mostly the benefits of RFID technology, further study is necessary, in 
particular on 3D (semi-) passive RFID tags that avoid the previsouly described 
limitations of 2D RFID antenna tag designs. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TEST METHOD FOR PROXIMITY SENSING TECHNOLOGY 
 
 This chapter presents a testing method for proximity detection and alert systems 
deployed on construction sites. Several scenarios typical of construction equipment and 
ground worker movement on construction sites were designed and tested. Specifically, 
the reliability and effectiveness of proximity detection and alert systems to provide alerts 
to construction site personnel during hazardous proximity situations were assessed. 
Devices were installed on pieces of construction equipment in an outdoor environment to 
evaluate the created test method for proximity detection and alert systems.  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Construction environments are typically comprised of multiple resources 
(personnel, equipment, and materials) that perform dynamic activities in a specific space. 
This often requires construction resources, such as ground workers and heavy equipment, 
to operate at close proximity to each other creating potential hazardous proximity 
situations. The risk of injuries and fatalities increases as contact collisions between 
ground workers and heavy construction equipment occur.    
Minimal information and data exists on how existing safety technologies can be 
implemented into construction environments to create an additional layer of safety 
protection for ground workers. Thorough evaluation of emerging safety technologies 
through experimentation simulating conditions of a typical construction environment is 
required. Evaluation data through an established test method can show the reliability and 
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effectiveness of these technologies, including proximity detection and alert systems. This 
test method can be used by construction companies to evaluate the capabilities of 
proximity detection and alert systems to meet specific needs of their construction sites 
and personnel.  
. 
8.2 Background 
A multitude of movements of construction resources coupled with the densely 
populated nature of construction sites can account for safety concerns resulting from 
proximity issues [68]. As previously discussed, hazardous proximity situations between 
ground workers and construction equipment are present on construction sites. The 
following review covers proximity detection and alert systems, magnetic field sensing, 
and testing methods of proximity detection and alert systems.  
 
8.2.1 Proximity Detection and Alert Systems 
 Various technologies and system combinations are thought to be capable of 
alerting construction personnel in real-time [209]. Initial testing and evaluation has 
occurred for proximity detection systems in other industries such as underground mining 
[163], the railroad industry [210], and manufacturing [211]. Safety technologies can 
provide workers with a “second chance” by creating an additional layer of protection for 
ground workers on construction sites [68]. Proximity detection and alert systems were 
reviewed for their capabilities to function in the mining [192] industry which shares 
characteristics with construction site environments [130].   
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Several parameters were used to assess each system including detection area, alert 
method, precision, size, weight, calibration functionality, power source, ability to identify 
people from objects, and others. Benefits and limitations of each technology were 
identified. For example, systems utilizing radio frequency technology can be impacted by 
direct contact with metallic objects [132][208] and experiences multipath or “crosstalk” 
that limit the system’s ability to distinguish individual worker proximity breaches 
[212][213]. Some of the evaluated systems were incapable of identifying people versus 
other objects [154][163][214]. These benefits and limitations were used to identify a 
reliable technology capable of detecting and alerting workers during hazardous proximity 
situations [154]. Results from the review indicate that proximity detection and alert 
systems utilizing magnetic field technology can be reliable in the construction 
environment.  
 
8.2.2 Magnetic Field Sensors 
Magnetic fields are created from motion of electric charges and are often 
accompanied by electric field waves creating electromagnetic fields. The strength of 
these electric charges (or current) is strongest close to the generating source and 
diminishes as the distance from the source increases. These currents are present in 
overhead high voltage transmission lines, near household appliances, and industrial 
settings such as near induction furnaces. Minimal experimental evidence exists that 
magnetic fields can affect human physiology and behavior in strengths levels typically 
found in public areas and specific to the construction environment [215]. 
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Magnetic sensors have historically been used primarily for navigation, but other 
needs have evolved as the technology has improved in compatibility with other electronic 
systems, sensitivity, and smaller size [216][217]. While conventional sensors can directly 
measure parameters such as temperature, pressure, strain, and light, magnetic sensors 
indirectly measure direction, presence, rotation, current, and angle, through indirect 
changes or disturbances in the generated magnetic field. For proximity detection 
applications, magnetic fields are affixed from a permanent magnetic, electromagnetic, or 
current source [218]. A biasing magnet affixed to a Giant Magnetoresistive (GMR) 
sensor is most often used to detect the presence of a ferromagnetic object. GMR’s allow 
for long magnetic field dependent changes in resistance in thin-film ferromagnetic and 
non-magnetic metallic multilayers [216]. The biasing magnet is mounted on top of the 
sensor so the magnetic axis is perpendicular to the sensitive axis of the sensor.  
A shell-based model of the magnetic flux density distribution was created to lay 
the foundation for identifying a worker’s location during hazardous proximity situations 
[219][220][221]. A Gauss meter measured three magnetic field shells in which the 
bottom half of the flux is an approximation based on the created shell measuring model. 
The shell range is dependent on the density of the generated magnetic flux [219].  
Several experiments have been conducted to better understand the correlation 
between signal strength and location of wireless communicating technological systems. 
One study found no direct relationship between the signal strength of RF and the location 





Figure 37: Test method (left) for measuring RF signal strength and results (right) 
[222] 
 
 Results from this study further presented barriers associated with implementing 
RF technology for proximity detection and alert systems in the construction environment. 
Other technologies, such as magnetic field systems, showed a stronger connection 
between signal strength and location of the receiver device. A similar study showed that 
signal strength of magnetic field proximity detection and alert systems followed the 
magnetic shells propagated by the EPU [216]. This study indicated that magnetic field 
proximity detection and alert systems could be a more viable candidate for potential 
deployment in the construction environment than RF systems. Figure 38 shows the 
magnetic shells generated from a magnetic field proximity detection and alert system and 
results of the signal strength measurement of the magnetic field proximity detection and 
alert system [216]. 
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Figure 38: Magnetic field shells projected from the EPU (left), and signal strength 
measurements of a magnetic field proximity detection and alert system (right) [216] 
 
8.2.3 Testing Methods of Proximity Detection and Alert Systems 
Past research has developed preliminary testing methods to evaluate various 
proximity detection and alert systems. Ground markings have been placed and manually 
measured to outline the alert detection area of a system in an outdoor copper mining 
environment [163]. Other testing methods integrated typical surface mining site 
obstructions (dirt berm) to conduct field trials on a radar proximity detection and alert 
system [206].  
 
8.3 Objective and Scope 
The primary objective is to create a testing method for evaluating the 
effectiveness and reliability of proximity detection and alert technologies in the 
construction environment. A secondary objective is to evaluate the testing method by 
subjecting a magnetic field proximity detection and alert system to each component of 
the prescribed testing method. The testing method assesses the magnetic field proximity 
detection and alert system’s ability to detect and alert construction site personnel when 
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hazardous proximity situations exist. The scope includes proximity issues between 
construction equipment and ground workers on level surfaces in outdoor construction 
sites.  
 
8.4 Testing Method for Proximity Detection and Alert Systems 
Each set of experimental trials of the testing method were designed to evaluate the 
reliability and effectiveness of a proximity detection and alert system when deployed in 
the construction environment on ground workers and heavy equipment. Each of the four 
experimental trials simulated functional characteristics of a construction site including 
combinations of static and mobile ground workers and heavy equipment. All trials were 
performed in an outdoor environment with mostly clear weather conditions and a 
temperature of approximately 85 degrees Fahrenheit. A clear and flat ground surface with 
no obstructions was used as a test bed for all trials. The testing method to evaluate 
proximity detection and alert systems, experimental methodology, and results of the 
magnetic field sensing system are presented. The presented methodology and examples 
should be followed when evaluating proximity detection and alert system include test bed 
set-ups, data collection methods, and data analysis.  
 
8.4.1 Magnetic Field Proximity Detection and Alert System 
Based on previous research results including cited benefits and limitations 
[130][163][173], proximity detection and alert systems using low frequency magnetic 
field technology (approximately 73 kHz) can function on construction sites. These 
systems provide a wireless, reliable, and rugged technology that is capable of functioning 
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in the harsh outdoor construction environmental setting. Magnetic field proximity 
detection and alert systems are thought to be capable of providing alerts in real-time for 
equipment operators and ground workers during hazardous proximity situations, create a 
tool for mitigating risk, monitor with minimal distractions (e.g. alerts that occur during 
non-hazardous conditions also called nuisance alerts), and create an additional protection 
layer for ground workers. The system requires a power source generated from the piece 
of construction equipment and devices must be installed on ground workers and 
construction equipment. 
The EPU of the proximity detection and alert system contains a magnetic antenna 
connected to a central hub unit capable of calibrating the proximity detection area. The 
prototype dimensions of the EPU antenna are: 25 centimeters in length, 19 centimeters in 
width, and 10 centimeters in thickness and will be smaller in size after further 
modification. The EPU antenna generating the magnetic field contains a ferrite core 
material powered by the system to generate a magnetic flux. Unlike other omnidirectional 
antennas that broadcast signals (such as RF antennas), magnetic shells generated from the 
source that create the magnetic field resembling a 3D oval shape rather than circular due 
to the magnet’s polarity [219]. For the proposed experiments, the EPU antenna was 
placed on top of a wheel loader cabin as seen in Figure 39. The antenna was positioned 
3.5 meters vertically from the ground surface and 0.6 meter (horizontally) directly behind 
the operator’s seated position.  
The PPU of the proximity detection and alert system can be installed on the PPE 
such as a hard hat or safety vest of a construction worker. The receiver unit of the PPU is 
approximately 6 centimeters in width, 9.5 centimeters in length, and 2.5 centimeters in 
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thickness. This device uses a standard size lithium-thionyl chloride battery for power, and 
was held approximately 1.5 meters vertically from the ground surface by the test person 
for the designed experiments. Both the EPU and PPU can be viewed in Figure 39. For all 
experimental trials, the EPU antenna was attached to the top exterior of a wheel loader 
operator cabin.  
   
Figure 39: Mounting position of EPU (left), PPU held by test person (right) 
 
The EPU antenna projects a magnetic field which is intercepted by surrounding 
PPU’s that breach into the pre-calibrated field. Various strengths of the generated 
magnetic field emitted by the EPU antenna allow for various alert distances. The system 
is capable of providing four separate alert distances in one setting. Each of the four 
separate alert distance settings can be calibrated to the desired physical horizontal 
distance between the construction equipment and ground worker. The alert distances 
allow for variations in alert distances depending on the location of the ground worker 
inside the magnetic field. The PPU alert zone is farthest from the EPU antenna mounted 
on the piece of construction equipment, and the stop zone is closest to the construction 
equipment.   
As the ground worker nears the piece of construction equipment and penetrates 
the generated magnetic shells from the EPU antenna, the alert method intensifies in 
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frequency of visual (flashing LED lights) and audible (alert beeping sounds) to the 
equipment operator. These alert distances can be calibrated for specific pieces of 
construction equipment and site conditions. The ground worker and operator alert method 
is presented in Table 22 for each calibrated alert zone. The alert distance was calibrated 
for the longest distance for the deployed EPU antenna, and the calibrated alert distance 
remained constant for all experimental trials.  
 
Table 22: System alert zones and methods 
Zone Ground Worker Operator 
PPU alert 1 audible beep No alert 
Hazard zone  1 audible beep 1 audible beep to operator with visual  LED flashes 
Slow zone 1 audible beep 2 audible beeps with visual  LED flashes 
Stop zone 1 audible beep 3 audible beeps with visual LED flashes 
  
The following sections prescribe a method for evaluating the effectiveness and 
reliability of a proximity detection and alert system when deployed in the construction 
environment. Five different experimental trials are designed to emulate typical 
construction interactions between construction equipment and ground workers. To test 
proximity detection and alert systems for future use in the construction environment, each 
of the experimental trials should be performed as prescribed in the following 
descriptions. The following experimental trials make up the testing method for proximity 






1) Technology selection 
2) Coverage area 
3) Mobile equipment with static worker 
4) Obstructed PPU 
 5) Mobile equipment and mobile worker 
 
8.4.2 Coverage Area 
The coverage area experimental trials were the first section of the testing method 
for proximity detection and alert systems. This tested evaluated the reliability of the 
proximity detection system to provide an alert to a mobile test person while the wheel 
loader remained static. The experimental test bed was outlined by placing ground 
markers at 36 equal distant locations (10 degree offsets) around the circumference of a 
15.2 meters (50 feet) radius circle on an unobstructed, flat surface.  These ground makers 
designate the start of the angles used by the test person to approach the EPU antenna. The 
center point of the circular test bed served as the horizontal EPU antenna location which 
was installed on a wheel loader. The EPU antenna was positioned 3.5 meters vertically 
from the circle’s center point. The PPU was held at shoulder height (approximately 1.5 
meters) near the test person’s left shoulder. The test bed is shown in Figure 40.  
 
 
Figure 40: Test bed for static equipment and mobile ground worker 
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The test person equipped with the PPU approached the wheel loader at a constant 
walking pace (approximately 2 meters per second) from 36 equal distant approach angles. 
When the proximity detection and alert system detected the worker’s breach into the 
hazardous proximity area, an alert was activated and the test person stopped walking and 
measured the horizontal alert distance. The alert distance was measured from the test 
person’s stopped position to the EPU antenna. Three trials were tested for all angles, and 
32 trials were completed for each 30 degree section (0°, 30°, 60°, … , 300°, 330°) so that 
results at these locations were within a 95 percent confidence interval (Fowler 2009). 
This procedure was completed for both the PPU and hazard alert zones (also called the 
EPU alert zones).  
A statistical analysis was performed on each approach angle of the test person. 
The data was also analyzed for false positive readings and nuisance alerts. The following 
circumstances were used for each of the following: 
 
False positive alert: Instances in which the test person strikes the construction 
equipment before an alert is activated 
Nuisance alert: Alert distance measurements three times larger than the upper 
quartile value for each specific approach angle 
 
No nuisance alerts or false positive alerts were recorded during the experimental 
trials. Table 23 shows the data analysis results of the 30 degree intervals for the PPU alert 
distance measurements. Because the proximity alert area for magnetic fields mimics an 
oval shape outline, the range, standard deviation, and minimum values are used as a 
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comparison metric for different approach angles rather than minimum or maximum 
values. Values in bold text represent the lowest range and lowest standard deviation. The 
values in italic text are the highest range and highest standard deviation. After identifying 
increased range and standard deviation values, further investigation can improve the 
precision of the calibrated alert zone. These statistics should be recorded and analyzed 
when performing the coverage area experimental trials. 
 
Table 23: Statistical analysis of horizontal alert distance measurements 
 Median Alert Distance Range Standard Deviation 
Angle EPU PPU EPU PPU EPU PPU 
360° 7.83 m 12.01 m 1.28 m 3.29 m 0.23 0.72 
30° 7.97 m 11.84 m 1.52 m 1.74 m 0.32 0.38 
60° 6.52 m 10.24 m 0.91 m 1.34 m 0.60 0.34 
90° 7.31 m 11.93 m 1.16 m 1.25 m 0.34 0.61 
120° 12.11 m 13.66 m 2.26 m 1.89 m 0.48 0.36 
150° 6.55 m 13.59 m 1.80 m 2.26 m 0.33 0.39 
180° 9.82 m 15.31 m 1.77 m 2.07 m 0.32 0.61 
210° 9.43 m 14.63 m 1.28 m 1.92 m 0.43 0.38 
240° 8.52 m 11.55 m 1.07 m 2.04 m 0.33 0.41 
270° 6.76 m 10.43 m 1.98 m 1.65 m 0.30 0.52 
300° 7.08 m 10.10 m 1.49 m 1.86 m 0.33 0.41 
330° 7.41 m 10.49 m 1.34 m 2.07m 0.30 0.52 
 
Recorded alert distance measurements for both the PPU and EPU experimental 
trials were displayed on coverage area graphs. Figure 41 shows the median PPU recorded 




Figure 41: Active proximity warning zone for PPU alert 
  
8.4.3 Mobile Equipment with Static Worker 
The second set of experimental trials within the prescribed testing method 
evaluated the effectiveness the proximity detection system on a static test person and 
mobile wheel loader. The same flat, unobstructed surface was used to conduct these 
trials. Five ground makers were positioned at 4 meter intervals along the straight line 
parallel to the wheel loader’s travel path (Figure 42). The wheel loader approached the 
test person at a constant speed of 8 kilometers per hour and stopped once the EPU alert 
was activated for 32 trials. The PPU was positioned at the static location of the test 
person in the two following locations:  
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1) 0 meter vertical distance from the ground surface and  
2) 1.5 meter distance from the ground surface.  
 
For both of the PPU position, the wheel loader approached the test person 
traveling in the forward direction and reverse direction. Data obtained from these trials 
was analyzed using the same statistical criteria discussed in the previous experiment. No 
false positive or nuisance alerts were recorded during the trials. Results can be viewed in 
Figure 42. The notation along the horizontal axis for each plot uses the following 
notation: (wheel loader travel direction, vertical distance of PPU from the ground 
surface).  
 
   
Figure 42: Mobile equipment and static worker experiment (left); boxplot of 
proximity alert distances (right) 
 
Table 24 shows the statistical range, standard deviation, and interquartile range 
for each of the four experimental scenarios. The reverse travel direction experienced a 
longer distance alert range than forward possibly due to the mounting position of the EPU 
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antenna. The highest statistical range value (3.6 meters) was experienced when the PPU 
was placed on the ground and the wheel loader traveled in the forward direction. The 
lowest statistical range value (2.4 meters) occurred when the PPU was at the ground level 
and the wheel loader traveled in the reverse direction. The highest interquartile range was 
recorded when the PPU was located on the ground and the wheel loader traveled forward. 
The lowest interquartile range was experienced when the PPU was located at 1.5 meters 
vertical from the ground surface and the wheel loader traveled in the forward direction.  
 
Table 24: Statistical analysis of mobile equipment with static worker alert distances 
Travel Direction Forward Forward Reverse Reverse 
PPU Height 0 m 1.5 m 0 m 1.5 m 
Range 3.6 m 2.5 m 2.4 m 3.1 m 
Standard Deviation 0.7 m 0.5 m 0.6 m 0.8 m 
Interquartile Range 1.1 m 0.5 m 0.8 m 1.0 m 
 
 
8.4.4 Obstructed PPU  
To evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of the proximity detection system 
while the LOS between the EPU and PPU component was obstructed, a set of 
experimental trials were designed and executed to simulate this condition in the same 
previously created test bed. A crew cab maintenance truck was positioned perpendicular 
to the wheel loader’s travel path such that the back of the truck was aligned with the 
ground markers such that the truck would obstruct the LOS between the EPU and PPU. 
The PPU was vertically positioned 0.9 meter from the ground surface and horizontally 
located 1.3 meters perpendicular from the wheel loader’s travel path such that the truck 
was between the EPU and PPU (see Figure 43). The wheel loader approached the PPU at 
a constant speed and stopped once the EPU alert was activated for 32 trials in both the 
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forward and reverse travel direction. Results of the obstructed PPU experiments are 
shown in Figure 43.  
  
    
Figure 43: Mobile equipment and static worker obstructed PPU experiment (left); 
boxplot of proximity alert distances (right) 
 
The interquartile range of the forward travel direction data was smaller when 
compared to the reverse travel direction, but the range of both data was within 0.1 meter. 
The standard deviation for the forward and reverse travel direction was 0.4 and 0.3 
respectively. When placing the PPU on the ground surface directly behind the truck’s tire 
wheel, both the PPU and EPU alerts were not activated.  
 
8.4.5 Mobile Equipment with Mobile Worker 
The final set of experimental trials of the proximity detection and alert system 
testing method was completed to evaluate the reliability of the proximity detection 
system when both ground worker and construction equipment are mobile. The LOS 
between the PPU and EPU was not intentionally obstructed, and the PPU was held by the 
ground worker at approximately 1.5 meters vertically above the ground surface. The 
ground worker and wheel loader begin to travel towards each other along a straight path 
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at the same time. The wheel loader traveled in the reverse towards the ground worker. 
The ground worker traveled at approximately 2 meters per second and the wheel loader 
traveled at approximately 8 kilometers per hour. Both the ground worker and wheel 
loader operator stop moving at the moment they heard their respective alerts and the 
horizontal alert distance was measured from the PPU position to the closest wheel loader 
component (rear bumper nearest the test person). The experimental test bed and process 
can be viewed in Figure 44.    
 
 
Figure 44: Mobile equipment and mobile worker experiment 
 
For all 32 trials completed, the wheel loader and ground worker stopped before 
intersecting travel paths. The range of the trials was 4.5 meters while the standard 
deviation was 1.3. The minimum measured alert distance was 3.5 meters, the maximum 
measured alert distance was 8.0 meters, and the interquartile range of the measured alert 
distances was 1.6 meters.   
 
8.4.5 Summary of Testing Method for Proximity Detection and Alert Systems 
 The experimental trials described in this section serve as the different components 
for the testing method for proximity detection and alert systems. Users of this testing 
method should follow the prescribed experimental trials and resulting data collection and 
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analysis methods. Table 25 provides a breakdown of the testing method for proximity 
detection and alert systems on construction sites.  
 
Table 25: Components of the testing method for proximity detection and alert 
systems 
Trial 1: Technology Selection 
 




1) Distinguish between people and objects 
2) Alerts are identifiable over general construction noise 
3) Activate real-time alerts for workers and/or operators 
4) Detection range is an adequate distance for construction equipment 
5) Function on construction sites 
6) Minimal required infrastructure 
Trial 2: Coverage Area 
 
Description: Test the system’s ability to detect and alert when construction 
equipment is static and the worker is mobile 
 
System Standards:  
1) Alert must be activated upon each approach before the worker contacts the 
equipment (no false negative alerts) 
2) All alert distances must be within three times the inner-quartile range value 
(no false positive alerts) 
3) Alert must activate for each approach angle 
Trial 3: Mobile Equipment with Static Worker 
 
Description: Test the system’s ability to detection and alert when construction 
equipment is mobile and the worker is stationary 
 
System Standards: 
1) Alert must be activated before the construction equipment reaches the 
stationary worker for each pass (no false negative alerts) 
2) All alert distances must be within three times the inner-quartile range value 
(no false positive alerts) 
3) Alert distance must have length such that the construction equipment comes to 
a complete stop before reaching the stationary test person for each pass 
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(Table 25 continued) 
Trial 4: Obstructed PPU 
 
Description: Test the system’s ability to detect and alert when equipment is 
mobile and the PPU is static and obstructed by an object or equipment 
 
System Standards:  
1) Alert must be activated before the construction equipment reaches the 
stationary PPU for each pass (no false negative alerts) 
2) All alert distances must be within three times the inner-quartile range value 
(no false positive alerts) 
3) Alert distance must have length such that the construction equipment comes to 
a complete stop before reaching the stationary PPU 
Trial 5: Mobile Equipment and Mobile Worker 
 
Description: Test the system’s ability to detect and alert when construction 
equipment is mobile and the worker is mobile 
 
System Standards:  
1) Alert must be activated before the construction equipment reaches the mobile 
worker (no false negative alerts) 
2) All alert distances must be within three times the inner-quartile range value 
(no false positive alerts) 
3) Alert distance must have length such that the construction equipment comes to 
a complete stop before reaching the mobile worker 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The safety practices currently used in the construction industry for ground 
workers and heavy equipment operating in close proximity has proven inadequate by the 
continued injuries and fatalities resulting from workers being struck by equipment or 
objects. The purpose of this research was to create and evaluate a testing method capable 
of assessing the reliability and effectiveness of proximity detection and alert systems used 
in the construction environment. Results obtained from implementing the testing method 
on a proximity detection and alert system indicate that a magnetic field proximity 
detection and alert system could provide an additional layer of protection for ground 
workers on construction sites.  
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A testing method was design with experiments to reveal the ability of a proximity 
detection and alert system to provide alerts in real-time for ground workers and heavy 
equipment operators during hazardous proximity situations. Four experiments simulating 
various human and heavy equipment interactions were completed to demonstrate the 
testing method for proximity detection and alert systems. Analyzed data (alert distance 
measurements) demonstrated the system’s ability to detect the presence of hazardous 
proximity situations on construction sites in real-time. If users of the test method 
experience undesirable results when performing the four prescribed trials, the user should 
conduct further testing such as field test without construction equipment as described in 
chapter 7 of this thesis.  
Furthermore, surveyed workers indicated the audible alert was differentiated from 
other common equipment alarms and construction site noise. The alert was activated for 
each trial resulting in no false negative alarms meaning the system activated an alert each 
time a proximity breach occurred. At the conclusion of the experimental trials of the 
testing method, participants should be involved in discussions to express their opinions 
about the effectiveness of the technology. These discussions can potentially reveal 
limitations of the technology not identified through experimental trials of the testing 
method. Results from the magnetic field proximity detection and alert system indicate 
that systems using magnetic field technology can more reliability and effectively provide 
alerts during hazardous situations on construction sites than the evaluated RF systems.  
The field trials with the magnetic field proximity detection and alert system were 
deemed successful; however other parameters were noted that could potentially have an 
influence on the system. Further testing for this specific system is required to better 
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understand the impact of metallic surfaces directly touching the EPU antenna, 
interferences from other wave frequencies (such as cellular phones), and reliability of 
PPU obstructed when placed on the ground surface. These variables should be further 
tested in both laboratory field settings and in simulated or actual construction 
environments. Unique experiments can be designed and implemented into the proposed 
testing method depending on specific situations of a construction company or site 
conditions. These experiments will allow for more evaluation of the reliability of 
magnetic field proximity detection systems. Prior to implementation, the system should 
be deployed in an active construction environment on actual ground workers and heavy 
equipment performing various construction tasks.  
The presented testing method provides a foundation for evaluating the capabilities 
of proximity detection and alert systems in the construction environment. The testing 
method was validated by performing the testing method of a magnetic field proximity 
detection and alert system. More detailed experiments may be required to further test 
specific capabilities of the system depending on the site conditions. Barriers identified 
when executing this testing method should also be further investigated through 





The intent of this chapter is to summarize and offer concluding remarks for this 
research. The chapter specifically addresses the research needs statement as well as the 
research questions presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Major findings of the research, 
identified limitations, and future research extensions of this work are discussed in this 
concluding chapter.     
 
9.1 Concluding Remarks 
 The construction industry has historically been one of the leading industries for 
workplace fatalities [4]. Governmental regulatory agencies, such as OSHA, require 
construction companies to record and report workplace accidents including illnesses, 
injuries, and fatalities which are categorized as safety lagging indicators [13]. Safety 
leading indicators, such as reporting near misses, allow for a worker safety performance 
measurement without requiring accident data. By reporting and analyzing near misses, 
potentially hazardous conditions or worker behaviors on construction sites can be 
identified before an illness, injury, or fatality occurs. Safety managers and other 
construction site personnel can disseminate near miss information into worker safety 
education and training.  
Contact collisions between ground workers and construction equipment account 
for 19% of construction fatalities per year [1]. Current safety requirements with regards 
to hazardous proximity situations in construction are inadequate. Sensing technology is 
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capable of alerting construction site personnel during hazardous proximity situations and 
recording these near miss events. Various applications of sensing technology for 
enhanced safety performance of workers during hazardous proximity situations are 
available. This technology allows for real-time decision making through alerts for 
workers as well as near miss data for safety management to assess. 
 Research questions were presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. These research 
questions and a summarized discussion are presented in the following:  
 
1) Can near miss events be recorded and analyzed to increase awareness of 
potential hazards on construction sites? 
 
The background review section (Chapter 2) of this thesis discussed a motivation 
for capturing safety leading indicator data including near misses. It is theorized 
that a multitude of near misses occur for each injury or fatality experienced on a 
construction site. Chapter 4 of this thesis presented a near miss reporting program 
available for implementation into a construction company. This program provided 
a methodology to record, analyze, and disseminate gained knowledge throughout 
the company. By incorporating newly identified site hazards or hazardous worker 
behavior into worker safety education and training, construction site personnel 




2) Can operator visibility be measured and analyzed for education of equipment 
operators of invisible areas around construction equipment? 
 
Limited operator visibility was identified as one of the leading causes for contact 
collisions between ground workers and equipment operators that resulted in 
injuries or fatalities. Current methods of measuring operator visibility (as 
prescribed by the ISO codes) are time and structurally intensive. The method 
presented in Chapter 5 allows for more operator visibility analysis and resulting 
information than is available with the current method. For example, the laser 
scanning and data processing cumulative time is approximately one hour 
compared to several hours required for the current prescribed ISO code method 
for the same result. Design components of skid steer loaders are also evaluated 
with regards to their impact on operator visibility.   
 
3) Are proximity detection and alert systems capable of detecting, and alerting 
construction personnel and equipment operators in real-time of hazardous 
situations? 
 
Contact collisions between construction equipment and ground workers cause a 
significant amount of workplaces fatalities and injuries each year. Sensing 
technology deployed in experimental test beds designed to emulate construction 
environment conditions demonstrated their ability to detect and record situations 
in which a ground worker breached a pre-defined hazard zone. One proximity 
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detection and alert system was able to reliably detect the presence of a proximity 
breach and provide alerts to ground workers and equipment operators in real-time. 
These experimental trials and results are presented in Chapter 6, 7, and 8 of this 
thesis. 
 
4) How should proximity detection and alert systems be evaluated for potential 
deployment onto construction sites? 
 
Many industry sectors in the U.S. are benefitting from the capabilities of sensing 
technology. Proximity detection and alert technology have been implemented in 
other industries to minimize human-equipment contact collisions. A test method 
was created (Chapter 8) to evaluate the capabilities of proximity detection and 
alert systems when deployed in the harsh construction environment. Equipment 
obstructions and movement of construction equipment and ground workers were 
evaluated and incorporated into the test method. By creating a testing standard, 
construction companies can evaluate proximity detection and alert systems from 
several manufacturers to better understand which systems can meet their specific 







The scientific contributions of this thesis are summarized in the following:  
 
 A near miss reporting program available for implementation by a construction 
company. Aspects of the program including program guidelines, near miss 
database template and program evaluation tool are discussed.  
 A test method to evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of proximity detection 
and alert systems when deployed in the harsh construction environment.   
 A test bed designed to emulate typical interactions between ground workers and 
construction equipment in the construction environment.  
 Scientific experimental evaluation data of several proximity detection and alert 
systems and concluding remarks. 
 Operator visibility measurement and analysis including visibility maps for various 
pieces of construction equipment.  
 
9.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 Although safety leading indicators provide a safety measurement method that can 
identify hazards and predict potential worker illnesses, injuries, or fatalities, data analysis 
is accomplished only after a safety leading indicator is identified. Other than providing 
real-time alerts for workers who breach pre-defined hazard zones, other hazard mitigation 
efforts resulting from analyzed safety leading indicator data are not available in real-time.  
All of the construction site personnel interviews conducted were of employees 
within construction companies who have previously implemented a near miss reporting 
program (see Chapter 4). Interview candidates were selected by willing companies which 
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excluded construction companies that had no near miss reporting program.  Future 
research efforts could integrate responses from construction companies that choose not 
implement a near miss reporting program.  
Research limitations associated with the operator visibility measurement data (see 
Chapter 5) is based on a static blind spot in which the operator holds his/her head at a 
constant elevation and position. Dynamic blind spots are more representative of operator 
visibility on construction jobsites. Because analysis effort of the operator visibility 
measurement data was manually performed, one future research step would be to fully 
automate the process. Other researchers have implemented dynamic blind spot mapping 
for operator visibility [63]. It would also be useful to integrate operator visibility 
measurement with proximity detection and alert systems for real-time alerts of workers in 
invisible areas around pieces of construction equipment.    
Several research limitations are found in the evaluated proximity detection and 
alert system. A multitude of conditions and variables were evaluated, but other scenarios 
were not included in this work. Although a complete coverage area was obtained around 
many pieces of construction equipment, the best mounting position for both the PPU and 
EPU were not identified. These mounting positions could have an impact on the pre-
defined proximity read range and the coverage area. Nuisance alerts were documented 
and analyzed, but limited attempts were made to eliminate these alerts. Further research 
is also needed to calibrate the system for specialized alert distances for individual pieces 
of construction equipment including operator and worker reaction time, operator brake 
distances, ground surface preparation and weather conditions. Lastly, all of the 
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components of the proximity detection and alert system evaluation should be tested in a 
long-term active construction environment. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONSTRUCTION SITE PERSONNEL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 This appendix shows the interview tool administered to construction site 
personnel on projects with near miss reporting programs in sections A.1, A.2, and A.3. 
The first set of questions (see A.1) were given to safety managers, the second set to 
supervisors including foremen (see A.2), and the final set were given to craft workers and 
laborers (see A.3). Section A.4 contains the paper report form made available to workers 
on various locations throughout the construction site. A near miss reporting database 
query by severity of the event is shown in section A.5.  
 
A.1 Interview Questions for Safety Managers 
Interviewee Information 
1) How long have you been a safety manager?  
2) How long have you been on this project?  
3) Is your time solely dedicated to this project?  
 
Company Profile 
1) What type of service does your firm provide (construction, owner etc.)?    
2) What sector describes most of your firm’s projects (e.g., industrial, energy, 
infrastructure, heavy industrial, commercial, heavy/highway)?    
3) What is the approximate annual revenue of your company?    
4) How many individuals does the company employ (approximate)?    
5) How many of these are field workers?   
6) What is the company's OSHA Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR per 200,000 w-h)?   
 
Project Information 
1) What type of project is this (e.g., industrial, energy, infrastructure, heavy 
industrial, commercial, heavy/highway)?        
2) Location of the project:  
3) What is the method of project delivery (e.g. CM, CM at Risk, GC, Design-Build)?   
4) What is the approximate dollar value of this project?    
5) What is the approximate percent complete?     
6) How many craft workers are employed on this project (including subcontractors)?  
7) How many first-line supervisors (or foremen) are employed on this project?    
8) How many safety personnel are employed on this project site?  
 173 
9) How many worker-hours have accumulated for this project?    
10) What is the project's OSHA Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR per 200,000 w-h)?    
11) Does the project maintain a first aid log?  
12) How many first aid injuries have been reported?    
 
Near Miss Reporting Program 
1) Is there a near miss reporting and analysis program?  
2) Which party initiated the implementation of the near miss reporting program 
(contractor or owner)? 
3) How are near misses defined?  
4) Who reports the occurrence of near misses? (workers, supervisors, anyone?) 
5) How are near misses reported? (verbal, written, automated, etc.) 
6) Are you using any technology to record or report near misses? If yes, how 
effective is it and how can it be improved? 
7) How do workers find out about the near miss program? 
8) How are workers encouraged to report near misses? 
9) Who receives the near miss reports? 
10) Who assesses the merits of investigating near misses? 
11) Who investigates the near misses? 
12) How many near misses have been reported on this project?  
13) How many near misses have been investigated on this project?  
14) What is your opinion about the effectiveness or value of the near miss reporting 
program? 
15) Describe any aspect of the near miss reporting program that could be improved. 
16) Do you feel that some workers are reluctant to report near misses? If yes, why?  
17) What is the single more important thing that you do to help ensure that the near 
miss reporting program is a success?   
18) Is there a worker-to-worker observation project in place on the project?    
19) If yes to question 18, approximately how many observations have been made on 
this project? 
20) Is there a stop work authority program on the project?   
21) If yes to question 20, approximately how often has work been stopped by a 
worker who observed that work was being done in an unsafe manner?  
22) How many of these incidents have been investigated and officially documented?   
23) Is any of the near miss data for this project available for use by the research team?   
 
A.2 Interview Questions for Foremen 
 
1) What is your trade?  
2) How long have you been working in construction?  
3) How long have you been working on this this project?  
4) How many workers are typically in your crew?  
5) Describe the near miss reporting program on this project? 
6) Can you explain what a near miss is? 
7) How many near misses have workers in your crew reported in the past 6 months? 
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8) How were those recorded and reported to upper management (manually vs. use of 
any technology)?    
9) Do you encourage your workers to report near misses?  
10) If yes for question 9, how do you encourage near miss reporting? 
11) Do you feel that some workers are reluctant to report near misses? If yes, why? 
12) Do you feel that the near miss program is good for promoting safety? 
 
 
A.3 Interview Questions for Workers 
 
1) What is your trade?  
2) How long have you been working in construction?  
3) How long have you been employed on this project?   
4) Are you familiar with the near miss reporting program on this project? If yes, 
describe the program  
5) How did you learn about the near miss reporting program? 
6) Have you reported any near misses on this project? If yes, how many? 
7) If applicable, describe a near miss you have reported. 
8) What feedback have you received on near misses that you have reported? 
9) How did you report it (manual vs. using technology)? 
10) If no on question 9, have you seen any near misses that you or someone could 
have reported? 
11) What is supposed to happen with information about near misses that are reported? 
12) Is information about near misses that have happened on other parts of the project 
or on other projects shared with you?  
13) Explain what a near miss is. 


















Figure A.1: Near Miss/Unsafe Condition Reporting Form 
 
A.5 Near Miss Reporting Database Query by Severity 
 
 
Figure A.2: Near Miss Database Report Query 
 
A.6 Near Miss Program Evaluation Tool User Questions 
Section 1: Project Information 
 
1) Project Name:  
2) Number of craft workers: 
3) Cumulative worker hours: 
4) Cumulative number of near misses reported: 
5) Cumulative number of near misses investigated: 
 
Section 2: Define 
 
1) A near miss reporting program is encouraged or required by the corporate office. 
2) A near miss reporting program is implemented on every project. 
3) The definition of a near miss is clearly understood by management. 
4) A near miss reporting program is implemented on my current project. 
5) The definition of a near miss is clearly understood by the craft workforce. 
6) All workers are expected to report near misses. 








Section 3: Roll Out 
 
1) All onsite craft personnel have completed specific near miss training. 
2) The project has specific training materials to define and explain the near miss 
reporting program. 
3) Worker training incorporates exercises to assist in identifying near misses. 
4) Workers are trained on the barriers to reporting near misses.  
5) Management personnel on the project have been trained on how to act and react to 
reported near misses.   
6) Administrative requirements of the near miss reporting program have been taken 
into account.  
 
Section 4: Collect 
 
1) The collection method enables workers to anonymously report near misses. 
2) Collected near misses are reviewed by project management personnel. 
3) Rate the ease of using and understanding the method for collecting near misses 
for craft workers. 
4) Collected near misses are reviewed by safety managers. 
5) Near misses can be verbally reported on the project. 
6) Workers are expected to enter near misses into a database. 
7) Supervisors are expected to enter near misses into a database. 
8) The project uses a database to collect and analyze reported near misses. 
 
Section 5: Analyze 
 
1) The near miss database is analyzed for trends (for example time, data, severity, 
craft, and demographic). 
2) All near misses are investigated. 
3) All reported near misses are analyzed for potential consequences. 
4) A team with several different project personnel are involved in the investigative 
team. 
5) The investigative team determines the “root cause” of a reported near miss. 
6) Near misses must be assessed within a determined time frame set by a safety 
manager.  
 
Section 6: Analyze 
 
1) The investigation team recommends corrective action based on investigation 
findings 
2) Management determines corrective actions based on investigation team 
recommendations. 
3) Implemented corrective actions are effective in preventing future incidents. 




Section 7: Share 
 
1) Project personnel that have access to near miss reports include: 
2) The investigation team creates a summary of the near miss and findings to be 
distributed to other site personnel. 
3) Reported near misses are shared with the craft workforce. 
4) Trends identified from the near miss analysis are shared with the craft workforce. 
5) Investigative findings are shared with the craft workforce. 
6) Construction site management personnel review near miss information with the 
craft workforce. 
7) Investigative findings are shared company-wide. 
8) The safety manager disseminates knowledge generated from the analysis of the 
near miss reporting data for safety training and education.  
9) Near miss reports are accessible and shared with safety managers across projects. 
 
Section 8: Encourage 
 
1) Workers are comfortable reporting near misses. 
2) Each construction site has a recognition program for near miss reporting. 
3) Management response to a reported near miss is appropriate for the identified 
potential. 
4) Workers are publically recognized for reporting a near miss. 
5) Management reaction to a reported near miss encourages additional reporting.  
6) Workers are privately recognized for reporting a near miss. 
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATOR VISIBILITY 
MEASUREMENT RESULTS  
 
This appendix shows results from the construction equipment operator visibility 
measurements. The following pieces of construction equipment were measured for 
operator visibility: Asphalt paver (section B.1), excavator (section B.2), vibratory roller 
(section B.3), and forklift (section B.4). A plan view visibility map, summary of the plan 
view measurements, a rear and front view visibility map, summary of front and rear view 
measurements, a side view visibility map, and a summary of the side view measurements 
is presented for various pieces of construction equipment evaluated.  
 
B.1 Summary of Asphalt Paver Visibility Measurement 
 






Table B.1: Summary of plan view asphalt paver operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Area of full circle 452.2 m
2
 
Area occupied by equipment 19.5 m
2
 
Blind spot area 89.5 m
2
 
Length of circumference (full circle) 75.4 m 
Visible length circumference 71.6 m 
Percent visible circumference 95.0 % 
Percent blind spot 15.5 % 
 
Table B.2: Summary of front/rear view asphalt paver operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object in the front of the equipment 52.2% 
Visibility of an object in the rear of the equipment 100.0% 
 
Table B.3: Summary of side view asphalt paver operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object on the left side of the equipment 100.0% 
Visibility of an object on the right side of the equipment 45.3% 
 
B.2 Summary of Excavator Visibility Measurement 
 
 




Table B.4: Summary of plan view excavator operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Area of full circle 452.2 m
2
 
Area occupied by equipment 20.9 m
2
 
Blind spot area 355.7 m
2
 
Length of circumference (full circle) 75.4 m 
Visible length circumference 58.4 m 
Percent visible circumference 77.5 % 
Percent blind spot 78.7 % 
 
Table B.5: Summary of front/rear view excavator operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object in the front of the equipment 0.0 % 
Visibility of an object in the rear of the equipment 0.0 % 
 
Table B.6: Summary of side view excavator operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object on the left side of the equipment 0.0% 
Visibility of an object on the right side of the equipment 25.3% 
 
B.3 Summary of Vibratory Roller Visibility Measurement 
 






Table B.7: Summary of plan view vibratory roller operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Area of full circle 452.2 m
2
 
Area occupied by equipment 5.84 m
2
 
Blind spot area 57.8 m
2
 
Length of circumference (full circle) 75.4 m 
Visible length circumference 71.4 m 
Percent visible circumference 94.7 % 
Percent blind spot 12.8 % 
 
Table B.8: Summary of front/rear view vibratory roller operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object in the front of the equipment 53.3 % 
Visibility of an object in the rear of the equipment 47.3 % 
 
Table B.9: Summary of side view vibratory roller operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Visibility of an object on the left side of the equipment 82.7% 
Visibility of an object on the right side of the equipment 47.3% 
 
 
B.4 Summary of Forklift Visibility Measurement 
 







Table B.10: Summary of plan view forklift operator visibility 
Item Measurement 
Area of full circle 452.2 m
2
 
Area occupied by equipment 23.8 m
2
 
Visible length circumference 49.6 m 
Blind spot area 271.3 m 
Length of circumference (full circle) 75.4 m 
Visible length circumference 49.6 m 
Percent visible circumference 65.8% 
Percent blind spot 60.0 % 
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APPENDIX C 
COVERAGE AREA MAPS OF PROXIMITY DETECTION AND 
ALERT SYSTEMS INSTALLED ON CONSTRUCTION 
EQUIPMENT 
 
Figures in Appendix C show the plan view of the proximity alert range for select 
pieces of heavy construction equipment. Each figure shows the coverage area alert 
distance for each piece of construction equipment. Results indicate that for larger pieces 
of construction equipment, several EPU antennas are required to achieve full coverage 
around the equipment footprint. The following pieces of construction equipment were 



























































PROXIMITY DETECTION AND ALERT PPU POSITION AND 
ORIENTATION EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
 
This appendix shows results from PPU orientation and position experiments when 
the PPU was mounted on both a worker’s hard hat and safety vest. These results are a 
continuation of results presented in Chapter 7.  
 
Table D.1: Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the side of a hard hat 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 8.9 m 5.7 m 7.3 m 
Range: 1.0 m 2.5 m 4.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.5 1.3 2.3 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 5.3 m 5.3 m 7.4 m 
Range: 1.8 m 1.5 m 5.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.9 1.5 2.7 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 6.5 m 3.1 m 8.6 m 
Range: 2.8 m 3.3 m 1.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.4  1.6 0.6 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 2.6 m 3.1 m 7.9 m 
Range:  1.5 m 1.5 m 2.5 m 









Table D.2: Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the front of a hard hat 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 36.5 m 38.2 m 38.4 m 
Range: 3.0 m 3.5 m 1.8 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.5 1.9 1.0 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 11.7 m 9.4 m 22.2 m 
Range: 3.0 m 1.3 m 1.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.6 0.6 0.8 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 36.1 m 10.8 m 36.8 m 
Range: 3.3 m 0.5 m 2.0 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.6  0.3 1.0 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 7.2 m 7.6 m 14.3 m 
Range:  4.3 m 5.8 m 3.3 m 
Std. Dev.:  2.1 2.9 1.6 
 
Table D.3: Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the back of a hard hat 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 9.8 m 14.4 m 10.6 m 
Range: 2.0 m 3.8 m 1.8 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.0 1.9 1.0 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 10.8 m 3.4 m 6.8 m 
Range:  1.3 m 1.8 m 4.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.7 1.0 2.4 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 5.8 m 28.8 m 26.8 m 
Range: 5.5 m 6.3 m 7.8 m 
Std. Dev.: 3.2  3.3 3.9 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 4.0 m 1.8 m 8.9 m 
Range:  2.5 m 0.5 m 3.3 m 









Table D.4 Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the front torso of a safety vest 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 38.5 m 32.9 m 35.7 m 
Range: 1.0 m 6.5 m 11.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.5 3.3 1.3 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 6.3 m 3.2 m 4.5 m 
Range:  2.0 m 1.0 m 3.8 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.0 0.6 1.9 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 33.7 m 33.8 m 36.5 m 
Range: 3.0 m 1.5 m 2.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 3.6  0.8 1.3 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 1.7 m 3.3 m 3.3 m 
Range:  0.5 m 3.5 m 1.3 m 
Std. Dev.:  0.3 1.9 0.7 
 
Table D.5 Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the back torso of a safety vest 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 0.5 m 2.8 m 0.8 m 
Range: 1.0 m 3.0 m 0.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.5 1.6 0.3 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 0.0 m 1.2 m 0.3 m 
Range: n/a 0.5 m 1.0 m 
Std. Dev.: n/a 0.3 0.6 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 2.0 m 0.0 m 0.5 m 
Range: 1.0 m n/a 1.0 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.5  n/a 0.6 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 2.1 m 0.0 m 0.0 m 
Range:  1.3 m n/a n/a 









Table D.6 Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the side shoulder of a safety 
vest 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 4.9 m 2.3 m 1.2 m 
Range: 2.8 m 2.0 m 1.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.5 1.0 0.8 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 6.1 m 6.8 m 0.2 m 
Range: 3.8 m 1.5 m 0.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.9 0.8 0.3 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 4.4 m 7.7 m 4.7 m 
Range: 5.0 m 2.0 m 1.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 2.5  1.0 0.8 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 1.2 m 7.3 m 2.4 m 
Range:  0.5 m 2.0 m 1.3 m 
Std. Dev.:  0.3 1.0 m 0.6 
 
Table D.7 Semi-passive tag orientations mounted on the top shoulder of a safety vest 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Orientation 1 
Mean: 6.8 m 3.7 m 24.4 m 
Range: 3.5 m 2.0 m 1.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 2.0 1.0 0.8 
Orientation 2 
Mean: 2.7 m 4.1 m 2.3 m 
Range: 2.0 m 5.0 m 2.5 m 
Std. Dev.: 1.0 2.5 1.4 
Orientation 3 
Mean: 8.8 m 8.8 m 5.1 m 
Range: 0.5 m 1.8 m 6.3 m 
Std. Dev.: 0.3  0.9 3.3 
Orientation 4 
Mean: 2.1 m 1.9 m 5.8 m 
Range:  1.3 m 0.8 m 2.3 m 








Table D.8 PPU orientation summary on the safety vest 
  PPU 1 PPU 2 PPU 3 
Top 
Mean: 38.5 m (1) 33.8 m (3) 36.5 m (3) 
Range: 1.0 m (1) 1.0 m (2) 1.3 m (4) 
Std. Dev.: 0.3 (4) 0.6 (2) 0.7 (4) 
Side 
Mean: 2.1 m (4) 2.8 m (1) 0.8 m (1) 
Range: 1.3 (4) 0.5 m (2) 0.5 m (1) 
Std. Dev.: 0.5 (3) 0.3 (2) 0.3 (1) 
Front 
Mean: 6.1 m (2) 7.7 m (3) 38.4 m (1) 
Range: 0.5 m (4) 1.5 m (2) 1.5 m (2) 
Std. Dev.: 0.3 (4) 0.8 (2) 0.8 (2) 
Back 
Mean: 8.8 m (3) 8.8 m (3) 24.4 m (1) 
Range: 0.5 m (3) 0.8 m (4) 1.5 m (1) 
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